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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EDICT OF MILAN.

The obvious purpose of the Emperor Constantine in publishing the Edict of Toleration in the year 313 was to remove the antagonism which had so long existed between the Christian Church and the Roman State. In this he succeeded. With the exception of the short period in which Maximinus continued the persecution in the Orient, and the futile efforts of Licinius and Julian the Apostate to revive the methods of proscription, the Christians were henceforth unmolested. They were at liberty to worship God, to carry on their liturgical observances and to inculcate and practise the doctrines of their religion. Paganism, however, was not extinct. It lingered on as the religion of dwindling groups of votaries, or survived in the customs and institutions of the people, or as the animating spirit of much of their jurisprudence. It no longer possessed the support of the state, nor was it upheld at the point of the sword. A new era had opened up. The abandonment of heathen practices was not looked on by the imperial authorities as an act of disloyalty or treason. Patriotism and paganism had ceased to be synonymous. Though Christianity and heathenism remained bitterly antagonistic, that antagonism could not, under the decree of Constantine lead to the shedding of Christian blood.

That the Christian religion should have come into conflict

with heathenism is not to be wondered at. No compromise or agreement was possible between such adversaries. There could be no common or neutral ground between beliefs so radically different. A religion of revelation and authority could not adjust itself to the vagaries of belief, the capriciousness of doctrine, and the multitudinous, uncertain and degraded notions of the deity found in paganism. Belief in the Unity of God is incompatible with notions of Divinity which found gods everywhere and in everything. The calm certainty in matters of religion which comes from the possession of doctrines guaranteed by the Revelation of God Himself, would not arouse sympathy or toleration for beliefs which fluctuated with each change in the mental attitude of those who entertained them. The irreconcilable opposition between Christian and pagan beliefs, however, does not explain why the Roman state assailed the one and defended the other. Had this opposition been the determining factor in the attitude of Constantine's predecessors, the Edict of Milan which proclaimed toleration for the Christians should have been at the same time a decree of proscription against the pagans. That it was not such is evidence that a new spirit was introduced into civil administration and that a new attitude in questions of religion had been forced on civil authority. The decree itself bears evidence that these changes were due entirely to the spread of Christian ideas.

Liberty in matters of religion was therefore the burden of Constantine's legislation. "We have, therefore, determined with sound and upright purpose," he writes, "that liberty is to be denied to no one, to choose and to follow the religious observances of the Christians, but that to each one freedom is to be given to devote his mind to that religion which he may think adapted to himself, in order that the Deity may exhibit to us in all things his accustomed care and favor. . . . Since this has been granted by us to them, liberty is granted to others also who may wish to follow their own religious observances; it being clearly in accordance with the tranquillity of our times, that each one should have the liberty of choosing and worshipping whatever deity he pleases." These words are an admission that

civil authority is restricted. What this admission meant in the affairs of civilization can best be estimated by comparing what was superseded with what supervened. This comparison will lie far outside the field of politics and political theory, but these in themselves are merely the application to a special field of human activity of other and more fundamental social and philosophic concepts. Viewed in this light the conflict between Christianity and the Roman state was a struggle between two forces with fundamentally different views regarding human nature and social obligations.

Strictly speaking the Christian and the pagan scheme of life have no common denominator. The one is a religion of revelation. Its truths rest on the authority of God Himself and it embodies a rule of conduct susceptible neither of change nor modification. Paganism on the contrary represented a system of beliefs which were in reality nothing but efforts to fix man's place in the universe. It was the fruit of experience and reflection expressed in a synthetic view of life in which all the problems of existence had been simplified and grouped around one central concept. It had a code of conduct and morals covering all phases of human activity and all social relations. The fact that these civilizations (including under this term man's social, political, ethical and religious activities), were the sum total of the knowledge and experience of the various peoples is the reason why they all possess one important and striking common characteristic. They were national. Human life and human obligations were envisaged from the standpoint of the tribe or nation. Outside of that there was no interest nor obligation.

As conceived in antiquity, therefore, all social and political ties were exclusively national. This theory had religion as a basis: for family, tribal or national affiliations were accounted for on the ground that all the members of these various groups were descended from a common ancestor who was at the same time its presiding deity. Each family, city or nation was, as it were, the embodiment of some god who protected it exclusively. Family ties and patriotism were synonymous with the worship

of its guardian divinity. Fustel de Coulanges has been at pains to show how universal this principle was in antiquity. The family was not held together because of descent from the same parents, nor by love, sentiment or authority, but by the religion of the domestic hearth, by ancestor worship. This colored all family relations, it gave marriage its binding force and lay at the bottom of all legislation on questions of celibacy, inheritance and succession. From this arose the enormous powers possessed by the *Pater Familias*, his rights over wife, children and dependents.¹

The same principle prevailed in all other groups: tribal, municipal or national. The constituent element in these various units was not a common heritage or common interest, but the worship of the same deity. The city had its gods, the state its gods and those were fellow-citizens or compatriots who gathered around the same altars or participated in the same sacred banquets.² This national exclusive character was the distinguishing trait of all the civilizations of antiquity. "One thing we know with practical certainty," says Professor Willoughby, "and this is that from the time when any sense whatever of obligation came to be recognized by men, the ideas of religious sanction, of customary obligation, and of legal authority were so intermixed that they were not distinguished even in thought. Law and custom were practically swallowed up in religious observances. A divine sanction or prohibition was attached to almost every possible act, public or private. The individual had his gods, the family its gods, as had also the larger social and political groups. Community of worship, rather than direct kinship or racial affinities, was the link which held the units together. Where, therefore, religion did not restrain there was, aside from the possible influences of affection, no restraint felt. Whatever the actual origin of any rule of conduct or principle of authority, whether the outcome of custom, force, or the natural product of kinship, the ultimate sanc-

¹ *La Cité Antique*, p. 39 seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131 seq.

tion was conceived to be derived from the will of the gods.”³ The Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Egyptians and the Greeks were united by the bond of a common religion. The same is true of the Romans with whom we are now more especially concerned. “The Roman state is disclosed to us as a union of a number of tribes or smaller social groups, united and organised upon an essentially religious basis. Community of religious worship is the one real bond of union. The smaller political groups are related to one another and combined with a single political whole through the performance of common religious rites. The unit of association is the family, and the family life is centred around its altars. Its absolute head, the father, is above all its high priest. So also in the Gens, common participation in certain religious observances furnishes the integrating element. Finally in the Roman state itself, the same principle is applied. The king or *rex* presides as high priest as well as supreme judge and leader in times of war.”⁴

As thus constituted, early society offered the spectacle of various groups, organised according to natural principles of kinship or some other bond, but in which religion dominated as an element of exclusiveness and particularism. The narrowness and rigidity of the earlier concepts were modified to some extent by the growth of the great Empires of Alexander and the Romans, or through the Philosophy of the Greeks, notably that of the Stoics, but as a working theory of government, the idea of humanity, of the human race as forming one great body with mutual duties and obligations never displaced under pagan auspices, the old national and restricted view of human life. So ingrained was this idea of the national character of religion and society that a sceptic such as Celsus, uses it as the basis of his attack on Christianity. The pagan Caecilius, in Minucius Felix, does not believe in a divine Providence, yet insists on the need of a national religion. “Since then,” he says, “either fortune is certain or nature is uncertain, how much

³ *Political Theories of the Ancient World*, p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

more reverential and better it is, as the high priests of truth, to receive the teaching of your ancestors, to cultivate the religions handed down to you, to adore the gods whom you were first trained by your parents to fear rather than to know with familiarity.”⁵

The striking and distinctive characteristic, therefore, of all these pre-Christian civilizations was that they were national in scope and purpose. Human life was looked on as being bounded by the limits of the tribe or kingdom or state. Religion, law and politics were identical or were merely three different aspects of the same thing, the sources of national pride, jealousy and exclusiveness.

Christianity, on the other hand, was universal and cosmopolitan. It viewed humanity at large as a great confederation of brothers, children of the same father, and subject to the same moral law. A spirit of universalism, cosmopolitanism in the broad humane sense, was substituted for the narrow, petty rivalry and hatred of separate peoples and states. “For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ,” says St. Paul, “There is neither Jew nor Greek: there is neither bond nor free: there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ.”⁶ “There is no distinction of the Jew and the Greek: for the same is Lord over all, rich unto all that call upon him.”⁷ St. Paul understood clearly what the new law might be expected to accomplish. He compares the old order with its “idolatry, witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths, quarrels, dissensions, sects, envies, murders, drunkenness and such like” with the new, enjoying the “fruit of the Spirit, charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, longanimity.”⁸ All mankind were included in this new confederacy. “Being many, all are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.”⁹ The bond uniting men in these fraternal relations was to be that of charity, “the charity of brotherhood.”¹⁰

⁵ *Octavius*, chap. VI.

⁶ *Gal.*, III, 28.

⁷ *Rom.* X, 12.

⁸ V. 19-23.

⁹ *Romans*, XII, 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, XII, 10.

These and numerous other passages in the New Testament, as well as the spirit and purposes of the Christians themselves, show that, in contradistinction to the separatism and exclusiveness of the ancient systems, Christianity assumed as a fundamental postulate of social relations, the doctrine of the unity of the human race. Philosophy and experience were gradually opening the minds of men to the truth of this fact, but it had never entered as a determining factor into their law or their politics. "Though by means of Greek philosophy and Roman policy, the human mind in Europe rose to an apprehension of a bond of unity between all mankind independent of class and national distinctions, it only found what was really wanted in the religion which had been long providentially prepared and was at length wonderfully manifested in the land of Palestine; a religion which neither, like other religions of Asia, unduly lost sight of the finite in the infinite, nor, like those of Greece and Rome, of the infinite in the finite, but contained the principles of their reconciliation, proclaiming the universal brotherhood of man, and enjoining, at least in a general way, all the virtues which the realisation thereof implies—while, at the same time, by its revelation of one God and Father of all, one Saviour, one law, one hope, laying open the foundations of moral force needed to enable men to carry into practice their convictions of the unity, equality and rights to love and justice, of all men."¹¹

As forces contending for the control of human life, therefore, paganism and pagan civilizations on the one side, represented national exclusiveness, state absolutism, and despotic control in matters of religion: Christianity, on the other, upheld universalism, expressed in doctrines and a moral code intended for humanity at large, and the restriction of civil authority to its proper sphere, and as a consequence freedom of conscience. As an act by which the Roman state surrendered all right to coerce men for their religious beliefs, the Edict of Constantine was, consequently, a triumph for universalism and humanity, over nationalism and exclusiveness. It was an admission of the

¹¹ Flint, *Philosophy of History*, p. 115.

mark of Catholicity in the Church, and a further recognition of that other quality, her independence, which has been and is still, a subject of concern and jealousy to civil rulers. To Constantine belongs the honor of having taken a step which none of his predecessors seems to have thought possible. "Throughout the entire period of Roman domination," says Gaston Boissier, "I do not know a single sage, whether a sceptic like Pliny the Elder, a free-thinker rid of all prejudices like Seneca, a philosopher honest and calm like Marcus Aurelius, who seems to have suspected that it would one day be possible to grant equal rights to all religions within the Empire."¹² Henceforward a citizen was under no obligation to accept his religion from the state, nor was the civil power committed to the maintenance of any creed. An important principle was triumphant: but the cause of contention was not finally and definitely removed. The Church had successfully vindicated its claim to be universal, but this very triumph made and will make her the subject of national jealousy of Cæsaro-Papism and Erastianism.

Another point involved in the Edict of Constantine scarcely of less importance than the first and closely connected with it, was that concerning individual liberty. On the subject of the relation of the individual to society there is still ample ground for discussion. The manner in which the matter is dealt with in the decree is worthy of notice, because it was the first time in history that a great nation went on record as being committed in any way to the doctrine of individual freedom. Expressed in modern terms concessions were made to the individual at the cost of a form of social organisation which may be described as collectivist. Collectivism not communism, best expresses the conditions which prevailed in pagan antiquity, as communism denotes a species of equality which never prevailed, while collectivism as applied to state organisation simply meant a régime where the will of the people was imposed in such a manner that individual rights and immunities were unheard of.

This condition was due to the fact that the state and its

¹² *La Fin au Paganisme*, vol. I, p. 57.

religion were regarded as being identical. To belong to one meant of necessity to accept the other, and consequently the individual was so completely absorbed in the social organism that he belonged to it body and soul. The state could dispose of his person as it saw fit, and decree that his whole life or so much of it as was worth while should be devoted to military service. It could seize and dispose of his goods and possessions as public interest demanded. All his energies and all his property were looked on as being at the disposal of his country. As far as any individual was concerned the state was omnipotent. It could invade his private life, and no matter what his personal inclinations might be, it could impose penalties, in the interest of religion as well as of public polity on those who chose to remain unmarried. Sumptuary regulations of the most galling and most ludicrous character were in existence, and these became more onerous as the states advanced in power and influence. The style of dress was prescribed for different classes of citizens. The amount and character of the ornaments they were permitted to wear were matters of legislation, and in some places these distressing enactments reached such a stage that for certain classes beards were compulsory while in other places the wearing of a moustache was under the ban. It was not until the third century, as a result of imperial rescripts, that the use of sleeved tunics by the better classes in Rome could be indulged in without fear of molestation.

So closely was the fate of the individual bound up in the state, and so callously were individual rights set aside, that in some places it was within the competence of the authorities to decree the death of delicate or deformed children. In certain states compulsory participation in political affairs was considered necessary for the public weal, and in the Greek republics neutrality in the numerous factional outbreaks was regarded as treason. In matters of education, parental rights were set aside and the state took charge of the education of children, that is, when it was possible, as in the smaller states, to attend to such matters. Questions of religion were never subject to individual discretion. To fail in loyalty to the national gods was tanta-

mount to treason. There were many who could not but look on the fables and the inconsistencies in pagan beliefs with scepticism and repugnance, but even they were not permitted to do or say anything derogatory to the national cults. There was, therefore, no sphere of human activity which the state might not invade at discretion, and no activities of its citizens which were not looked on as being under the collective will. The sanctity of private life was undreamt of, and in education and religion men were made to feel that they were to be moulded, fashioned and curbed to satisfy the needs of public interest. "It is a singular error that men have entertained," says Fustel de Coulanges, "in thinking that in the ancient states men enjoyed liberty. They did not have an idea of it. They did not believe it could exist in face of the state and its gods. The government often changed its form: but the nature of the state remained always the same, and its omnipotence never diminished. The government might be called monarchy, aristocracy or democracy; but none of these revolutions gave men true liberty, individual liberty."¹³

In theory as well as practice the state was absolute. Plato was so carried away by the necessity of proving that the state was the object of all effort that he formulated a scheme for an ideal republic, in which not only property, but the lives of the citizens were to be thrown into a common fund to be disposed of as public interest might demand. Marriage was to be arranged and supervised by the civic authorities, children were to be educated for its benefit, and that the work of the body politic might not lag, the citizens were to be divided into different classes. Even in Rome, where men's minds might naturally be expected to expand with her territorial acquisitions and with the necessity of dealing with subject and alien peoples, the idea of individual autonomy never displaced the old theory of state absolutism. "Its law was self-imposed, but was not looked upon as having for its aim the protection of natural rights of life, liberty, and property already possessed by the individual. On the contrary it was consistently held that all

¹³ *La Cité Antique*, p. 269.

private rights were the creation of law. The only idea of personality known to Roman law was that according to which the individual was the possessor of a group of legal rights." ¹⁴ Even the famous phrase, "*Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem*," has no meaning in Roman law without its continuation, "*utpote cum lege regia, quae de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat*." "Few phrases," says Carlyle, "are more remarkable than this almost paradoxical description of an unlimited personal authority founded upon a purely democratic basis. The Emperor's will is law, but only because the people choose to have it so." ¹⁵

The individual, therefore, as such, had no standing in any ancient community. He might enjoy great honor as citizen of some powerful state, he might have unlimited opportunity at times to indulge individual caprice, but of intellectual, moral and religious freedom he could have no hope. All his activities were bound and circumscribed by the collective will of that branch of society in which his lot was cast.

Without going to the extreme of elevating standards of anarchic individual freedom over corporate responsibility, such as were proclaimed in the eighteenth century, the Christian religion enunciated a doctrine of spiritual freedom, which liberated the souls of men from the oppressive exactions of the state. The limits of state prerogative and the binding obligation of civic obedience are nowhere better expressed than in the phrase: Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's. Here a sharp line of distinction is drawn between man's accountability to God, and the degree of his subjection to civil authority. Without in any manner derogating from his civic subjection to legitimate authority he is made to feel that there is a moral law enjoying the sanction of God Himself to which his actions must be made to conform.

While insisting on responsibility the Christian church also taught the immeasurable value of the individual human soul.

¹⁴ Willoughby, *Political Theories of the Ancient World*, p. 244.

¹⁵ *History of Mediaeval Political Theory*, vol. I, p. 64.

Thus the true doctrine of individualism, asserted in the teaching of the Church on prayer and the sacraments, may be regarded as the creation of the Christian religion. It did not impair, but reinforced the position of civil rulers, because being an expression of authority, believers were constantly reminded of that other Christian truth that "all authority is from God." The violation of the rights of the individual forms the constant complaint of the apologists in the era of persecution. "It is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions:" says Tertullian, "one man's religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion—to which free-will and not force should lead us."¹⁶ "We give offence to the Romans, we are excluded from the rights and privileges of Romans, because we do not worship the gods of Rome. It is well there is a God of all, whose we all are, whether we will or no."¹⁷ Lactantius expresses the same idea even with greater force. "Religion," he says, "is to be defended, not by putting to death but by dying; not by cruelty but by patient endurance; not by guilt, but by good faith."¹⁸

In granting to the Christians, therefore, the right freely to worship God, Constantine abandoned a prerogative of state authority which from time immemorial had been looked on as inviolable. In words that might have been borrowed from some Christian apologist he enacts into a principle of public polity that every one should henceforward have the right to practise whatever religion he desires, and that the will of the individual, not force, shall determine a man's religious affiliations. Not once but five times does he repeat that "freedom is to be given to each one to devote his mind to that religion which he may think adapted to himself." Such was the purport and meaning of the Edict of Toleration. It enunciated a principle never before admitted into the constitution of any state. A rift was made in the unbroken wall of prerogative behind which civil

¹⁶ *Ad Scapulam*, chap. II.

¹⁷ *Apology*, chap. XXIV.

¹⁸ *Divine Institutes*, v. 20.

authority had sheltered itself. Men were permitted to turn their thoughts and aspirations into fields which had hitherto been closed to them; but in receiving this individual freedom the Christian religion, to which they owed it, insisted that they were not permitted to stray away at will; but that they were bound to their allegiance as citizens by the moral law which followed them wherever they went.

The Edict of Constantine did not define the relations of Church and State: it simply made possible the discussion of such a question. It was a renunciation of the claim to absolute control of the individual, and a surrender of the collectivist idea of the state. Viewed from the side of the Church this change of attitude on the part of a Roman Emperor was an admission of her Catholicity and her independence.

The change in the organic law of Rome brought about by the Edict of Milan soon made itself felt in legislation. Religious liberty did not remain a dead letter. The enhanced value of human life which it implied produced legal changes which took the edge off the most oppressive features of the old code. There was no sweeping transformation. It is doubtful whether such would have been desirable or feasible. Paganism was still the religion of large masses especially of the most favored class, and as their views of law and legal ethics were still bound up with their religion, any attempt to enforce Christian standards on them would have the appearance of religious persecution and would have been directly contrary to the principles enunciated in the Edict of Toleration. It is doubtful whether the people were yet ready for the full measure of Christian citizenship, and whether any attempt to put them in possession of all the prerogatives which a Christianized state could offer, would not have led to evils greater than those already existing. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Constantine and his contemporaries were pioneers, and that they could hardly be expected to have a full vision of the thoroughly Christian nation. The Christians themselves were just emerging from the dark night of three centuries of persecution: the wounds of the last assault were not yet healed, and in the work

of church organization and that of repelling paganism once more rampant in the Arian heresy, they had little time for the discussion of social and economic problems. The world has had sixteen centuries of untrammelled Christianity, and it is only necessary to go back over the history of those years to realize that the forces which hinder the attainment of the ideal state were doubly potent in the time of Constantine.

Notwithstanding these obstacles it is no less than astounding how rapidly Roman politics and legislation responded to the new order. An adjustment based on a higher sense of human dignity took place which effectually removed the more glaring abuses of the old régime. The work of any legislator striving to introduce a new spirit into law was necessarily hampered by the manner in which paganism had intrenched itself in life and institutions. Rome could not be made over in a day; but enough was accomplished in the lifetime of Constantine to show that though he found it of the brick of paganism, he left it of the marble of Christianity. For purposes of a rapid survey of what was accomplished, the remedies provided for the more obvious evils may be summed up under three heads: political, social and economic.

In all the states of antiquity, there was a threefold division of the population: the favored classes, the slaves and the dispossessed, and three corresponding evils: despotism, slavery and poverty. The first of these, and the source of the others, despotism was fortified in the citadel of religion. Religious liberty, which put an end to the despotic omnipotence of the state, was the road to all other reforms. The state, however, had been modelled on the family, and civil authority was merely a counterpart on a larger scale of that exercised in the domestic circle. The family constituted the primary unit of administration. While its head lived he enjoyed supreme jurisdiction over children, grandchildren, retainers and dependents. His authority, the *patria potestas*, extended even to the *jus vitae necisque*. With the exception of the period of infancy all the members of the family were subject to the domestic tribunal and might, at the will of the *Paterfamilias* be condemned to

exile, slavery or death. Under this tyrannical rule the position of children was little better than that of slaves. They had no personal rights, and were incapable of holding property. Whatever they earned belonged to the *Paterfamilias*. Even the property (*peculium*) given by a father to his grown children was theirs simply *de facto*; *de jure* it remained his. The position of the wife was no better than that of the children. She was in everything subject to the will of her husband, as long at least as the old Roman form of marriage (*conventio in manum*) remained in force. Marriage *sine conventionione* adopted at a later period enabled the wife to retain her legal personality. Even these stringent regulations were not sufficient to safeguard the sanctity of the family and the state was compelled to enact laws against childlessness and celibacy.

Though the *patria potestas* had been for a long time a subject of concern to Roman legislators, nothing had been done to mitigate its harshness. The promptness with which Constantine attacked the problem shows that in the principles of the Christian religion he found the means to a ready solution. Family life was immediately placed on a new footing. Without impairing domestic authority measures were enacted which took from the head of the family the right of exposing children or of selling them into slavery. The father who slew his son was declared to be guilty of murder, and no child, without his own consent, could be adopted into another family. In former times a son was allowed to call his own only his military earnings (*peculium castrense*), Constantine gave them the right to all that they might earn in the public service (*peculium quasi castrense*) and by subsequent legislation to everything coming from other sources (*peculium adventitium*). The rights of women also received recognition. Marriage was placed on a different basis. From a civil contract it was recognised as a religious sacrament. Women were granted equal rights with men in the control of property, and the right of guardianship over children was conceded to them. Laws against celibacy and childlessness were abolished. Thus a long step in advance was made in recognising family ties as a relation founded on natural affection not on a legal fiction.

Constantine's reforms in regard to slavery are also worthy of notice. This widespread evil of all ancient civilizations instead of diminishing took deeper root as the Roman Empire progressed. Under Roman law a slave had no legal existence as a person. His position was defined in the following maxims: *Qui in potestate nostra est nihil suum habere potest; in personam servilem nulla cadit obligatio; cum servo nulla actio est; cum servis nullum est connubium; cognatio servilis nulla est.* "In the eyes of theoretical law they were mere chattels, objects, not subjects of property or other rights, with no more appeal to the courts of justice and no more legally recognised kinship among themselves than any other animal." The law was a faithful reflection of sentiment popular as well as philosophic. Varro in his work on Agriculture speaks of three kinds of implements for tillage: the dumb, wagons, etc., those that utter inarticulate sounds, oxen, and those that talk, slaves. Not only were slaves the property of their masters, but anything they might become possessed of was also his. In deference to public opinion, and perhaps, through reasons of economy, certain modifications in their hard lot were made in the second century, resembling those introduced by humane societies in our own times in favor of dumb animals. Masters who were guilty of excessive cruelty were compelled to sell their slaves, and nobody without the express permission of a court was permitted to compel them to fight with wild beasts. The city prefect was also empowered to hear the cases of slaves whose masters had treated them cruelly or indecently. Roman literature is filled with incidents showing the brutal and inhuman manner in which slaves were treated. They were flogged, branded, marked like cattle, and when old were turned adrift or killed outright. The lot of field-slaves, working in chains and herded at night in the filthy *ergastula* or slave-prisons, was hardly less repulsive than that of the house-slaves compelled to endure all the cruelty and degradation that might be inflicted on them by sensual and brutal owners.

It is hardly necessary to say that such outrageous conditions could not continue in a state touched in the slightest degree with

the spirit of Christianity. From the days of the Apostles a silent and effective transformation had been going on. "Where the spirit of the Lord is," said St. Paul, "there is liberty" (II Cor. III. 17). True to this principle all, masters and slaves alike were taught that in the Church all are equal, that all are brethren. Without proclaiming any general law of abolition Constantine enacted many measures tending to eliminate the old legal postulate that the slave was not a person. Masters were forbidden to treat their slaves with cruelty, and were to be dealt with as murderers if they caused the death of a slave by poison, dagger, stoning, by exposing him to wild beasts or in any other way. Going a step further it was decreed by law that the families of slaves were not to be separated. The old form of manumission was bound up in a tangle of legal formality. Now a simple letter, a declaration before witnesses or in the presence of the congregation was all that was necessary to confer this coveted boon. "For the first time the part of the Christian Church in the great struggle for the equal brotherhood of man was recognised. Freedom conferred upon a slave in the church before the bishop (*sub aspectu antistitum*) was made legally valid, just as if all the usual forms had been fulfilled. The ceremony of this Christian manumission must have been not infrequent; for when other legal business was forbidden on the Sunday, an exception was made in favor of the emancipation of slaves as 'an act of pleasure and joy, which fell in with the spirit of the festival.'" Slavery was not totally abolished but the slave everywhere received recognition as a man if not a citizen. Christianity could not stay the economic and political ruin of Rome which produced the Colonnate and Serfdom, but it had implanted a spirit of liberty which ultimately worked out to the extinction of both and to the attainment of full political equality.

In dealing with evils of an economic character not much could be expected in an age which knew nothing of economics. Poverty existed everywhere, and it was of a class meriting attention because it was apparently hopeless, inasmuch as its victims did not know where to turn for redress. Property had rights, but

no obligations. Persons had no spirit either of benevolence or charity. The poor, the economically oppressed, had relief neither in law, in public sentiment nor in religion. There were then as now, two classes of poor, those incapable of aiding themselves, the young, the old, the sick, prisoners, strangers, etc., and those, who while capable, were deprived of the means of subsistence. Economic evils do not readily yield to legislation, nor are legislators alert in devising means of betterment. The line between private and public action in such matters is not even yet clearly defined. Nevertheless we find in the legislation of Constantine, measures providing for the care of widows and orphans, the establishment of charitable institutions and the care and treatment of prisoners. "I have learnt," writes Constantine, in a letter to Menander, governor of Africa, "that prisoners in the provinces, suffering from want of food and sustenance, sell or pledge their children. I direct therefore that any one found in these circumstances, who has no private means and who finds it a grievous difficulty to support his children, should receive assistance from my imperial revenue. For it is utterly inconsistent with my character to allow any one to perish of hunger or be driven to an inhuman action." For the other class, the victims of economic causes, there is apparently no remedial legislation. The Church had its remedies, these it has proclaimed unceasingly, but they do not seem to have found their way into any code, mediaeval or modern.

It is not necessary to say anything about the legislation on adultery and seduction, on concubinage and gladiatorial contests, which were enacted after the Edict of Milan and which drew their inspiration from Christian ideas of morality and human dignity. The punishment of crucifixion was done away with, criminals were no longer to be branded on the face "the face which is fashioned to the likeness of divine beauty." Church and State did not remain neutral and Sunday was set apart as a day of rest and devoted to divine worship. The clergy were exempted from the burdens of municipal offices, the legal, corporate character of the Church was recognised, the position of the bishop as spiritual head of the flock was extended to cover

matters of secular interest. He became an extra-judicial arbitrator which made him in time what he became under the legislation of Justinian, the *Defensor Civitatis*.

Thus the Edict of Milan not only settled civilization on a new basis, it led to the reform of some of the most crying abuses of the old order. Church and State were separated, the terms of their future relations, union or separation, were left to the decision of succeeding ages. Slavery lost its most repulsive features by the reinstatement of bondmen as moral beings. This crying evil has vanished from the world at least from that portion of the world which accepts the Christian yoke. Two of the characteristics of society in pre-Christian times have disappeared, and men are no longer the religious nor social chattels of a system founded on force and held together by the merely material object of collective welfare. The third evil, that dealing with economic injustice, is now up for adjudication. Two remedies are offered. That of complete social control, the surrender of the individual to the community, and that of Christianity, conserving the rights of the individual in a society animated by the strictest principles of corporate responsibility. The future will have to decide whether the expansion of human interests and sympathy which marked the promulgation of the Edict of Milan and which has inspired legislation destructive of despotism and slavery will be narrowed down to the rigid limits of a collectivist or socialistic civilization.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE BELIEF IN GOD.

It is the distinguishing trait of Catholic philosophy that, far from advocating the separation of revealed from natural truth, it claims to unite these two in such a way that reason is benefitted by revelation and faith is rendered acceptable by the use of reason. The Catholic historian of philosophy has no difficulty in showing the disastrous consequences of the method which separates revealed truth from natural truth. Errors in regard to the existence and nature of God, the meaning and origin of the universe, the destiny of man, the foundations of conduct, the existence and nature of the human soul,—these are sufficiently striking evidence of a fatal flaw somewhere in the method of modern philosophy. There can be no hesitation as to the incompatibility of atheism, agnosticism, materialism and hedonistic utilitarianism with the fundamental teachings of the Catholic Church. And it ought to be obvious that if these errors are deplorable, as they certainly are, then the method in philosophy which precludes them has that much in its favor, while the method which does not preclude them, but, as history shows, has led to them is, so far, undesirable in philosophy.

It is, however, a more difficult, though a more pleasing, task to show how the Catholic method in philosophy, the method which brings faith to the aid of reason, avoids these errors and strives not only to refute them but to eradicate them. The task is difficult because of the misunderstandings that have grown up in the centuries since Descartes inaugurated the method of separation. The most prevalent misunderstanding is that which sees in the union of reason and revelation the subjugation of the human mind to the tyrannical authority of the Bible or of the Church. Yet, this is a view which should hardly need refutation. The protests of Catholic philosophers and scientists are proved sincere by their works. The literary output of the Middle Ages in particular ought by its very vastness vouch for

the freedom, within reasonable limits, of the mind of the Catholic believer. In the present paper we are more concerned to show in a positive way *that* Faith aids Reason and *how* Faith aids Reason in regard to belief in the existence of God. Another misunderstanding, perhaps equally prevalent, is the conviction that, if there is a Catholic philosophy, that must mean a philosophy officially taught by the Church and imposed on all the faithful in the same way as the Creed. No Catholic needs to be told that this is not true. The Church has never proposed a system of philosophy for our belief. Neither when Plato was the favorite author of Christian thinkers nor when Aristotle was "the master of those who know," nor even when Thomas of Aquin was proclaimed teacher of the Universal Church and Patron of Catholic Schools, did the Church wish to sanction the leadership of these philosophers to the extent of proclaiming them right and all others wrong. This much liberty, at least, is accorded the Catholic philosopher; he may follow any of these as a leader or reject them all and still be a Catholic philosopher. He is Catholic in the negative sense, so long as he denies no dogmatic or moral truth that is defined as of Faith, and in the positive and the better sense of the phrase, he is a Catholic philosopher if he brings his Faith to the aid of Reason. It is our immediate task to show how this is done, and in particular in regard to the existence of God.

Atheism, which denies the existence of God, is often a state of the soul, not a conviction of the mind. I do not say it is always a condition of soul, and never an intellectual conviction. But I do say that frequently Atheism is due, not to erroneous or faulty reasoning, but to some perversion of sentiment. The greatest mystery this side of heaven is the human heart itself. What will a man do in a given set of circumstances; how will he behave in a certain crisis; how will he be affected by grief or sorrow or disappointment, or joy or gladness or success? How will he bear up under misfortune, or how will he stand the test of prosperity? Will these things sweeten his life or sour it?—You understand the figure of speech. But you understand also that, even in the case of one whom you know

well, you cannot answer these questions with certainty. You understand that what makes a saint of one man may make a sinner of another, that what sends one man to the monastery may send another into the ranks of infidelity. What makes one man love God may make another hate Him; sentiments which deepen Faith and plant it firmly in the soul of one man may be the cause why another loses his faith altogether, and becomes an Atheist. There is, then, the atheist to whom conviction comes from perverted or disturbed state of soul, and not from logical reasoning. In him feeling sits enthroned, and reason is only the handmaid of passion. For this is the most aggressive type, and naturally the first to take offence if one so much as mentions such a type at all.

Then, there is the Atheist of conviction, who has been brought to his conviction in various ways, but not like the former class by the wreck of his hopes, the loss of his peace of mind, or some other crisis of feeling. All who deny the existence of God profess to belong to the second class. They are often not aggressive at all. They feel no ardent desire to make converts to their own way of thinking; they are unconcerned about the beliefs of others, though they do protest energetically, as they have a right to protest, when the honesty of their profession or the sincerity of their motives is questioned. The popular mind abhors and to some extent, fears, an atheist, and it is quite unfair to appeal to such feeling or rouse such hostile sentiment, when one is dealing with an honest man who is not a disturber.

The origin of the atheist's conviction is not always easy to trace. He himself cannot always help us. Frequently, however, we can see in the cultivated mental habits of the man the source of his present belief. A mind trained to see only the material side of life, unlearned in the appreciation of spiritual values and spiritual things soon loses the power of conceiving anything to be real unless it is material. "No one has even *seen* God" is to such a one the literal truth and at the same time a refutation of all the claims of the theist. But, defective education and the cultivation of wrong mental habits will not account for Atheism in every case. There are purely logical

sources of Atheism, errors of reasoning, false conclusions in philosophy; there are Atheists who are made Atheists, not by any antecedent condition or circumstance, but by the drift of their own philosophical reason. When a man reaches the point where he is satisfied that this universe is self-explanatory and self-sufficient; when he is convinced that material forces and material substances explain all reality and that these forces and these substances had no origin except chance; when, in fact, he believes that the universe had no origin outside itself, or no origin at all,—then he feels that the existence of God is a useless and unnecessary hypothesis. He calls attention to the savage who “sees God in clouds and hears him in the wind,” because the savage intelligence cannot understand that these phenomena are explained by atmospheric pressure and the presence of water vapor. So, says the atheist, the theistic hypothesis is a confession of ignorance. Modern science explains the whole universe, as it explains the clouds and the wind, without having recourse to the idea of a Creator or an Intelligent Ruler of the universe. The idea of God can, therefore, be dispensed with. This type I should call the purely intellectual atheist, whose reluctance to admit the idea of God is, he thinks, the outcome of scientific study. If he has any feeling in the matter it is because his motto is “more light” and he thinks that the belief in God casts a shadow over the field of science. He does not hesitate even to describe that belief as a superstition. He classes it with the absurd convictions of the savage, the feeble-minded and the uneducated. And yet, he is not always free from superstitions himself. Human nature is more powerful than logic, and human nature has not changed essentially since the days of Bion who, as the first historian of philosophy tells us, denied the gods and yet submitted to the ministrations of the sorceress:

Then did this atheist shrink and give his neck
 To an old woman to hang charms upon;
 And bind his arms with magic amulets;
 With laurel branches blocked his doors and windows,
 Ready to do and venture anything
 Rather than die.

More in pity than in condemnation we too have seen the fear of death and other elemental fears carry the day against logic and science, and our reflection is that they who rank belief in God among the superstitions might well set their own house in order, ere they start to upset the beliefs of their Christian neighbors. Such men as Francis Bacon and the late Dr. Arnold of Rugby have doubted whether there is really any sane human being who believes this universe to be self-explanatory, whether, therefore, the purely intellectual atheist exists. Popular imagination and outraged pious opinion often place in this category the learned man whose cautious qualifications are misunderstood or ignored, and who is more often an agnostic than an atheist. It would, however, be absurd to say that all atheists are agnostics, and it seems undeniable that, if words mean anything, then there have been philosophers to whom the existence of God as an explanation of the universe is an entirely gratuitous hypothesis.

The second source of Atheism as a conviction is the terrible problem of Evil. Like all problems this arises from a conflict of two truths which are as undeniable as they are apparently incompatible. One truth is that God is good. No matter how the human mind may hesitate in regard to other attributes of Divinity, it hastens to include among the prerogatives of the Infinite, goodness in the highest degree, goodness unmixed with evil, goodness unlimited and unchecked, because combined with omnipotence. The goodness of God is not the problem, but only one term of the problem. The other is the existence of evil. This, too, is undeniable. There exists evil, physical, such as pain and suffering; intellectual, such as ignorance and stupidity; moral, such as sin and malice. And, the more we learn about the world in which we live, the more we come to realize the extent to which evil exists. Nature kind, beneficent, the mother bountiful, must now give way to the concept of Nature cruel, relentless, a tormentor of the innocent as well as the guilty: "Nature red in tooth and claw" is the modern idea. This, again, is not in itself a problem. It is the other truth which helps to make the problem. The problem is how to

reconcile the two, the goodness and omnipotence of God on the one side and the existence and prevalence of evil, on the other. It would be easy, of course, to evade the difficulty by ascribing evil to some other agent, as the Manicheans did. But, such a solution no longer satisfies the thinking mind. There are left three alternatives: first, to admit both truths and try to reconcile them, as Christian philosophy does, second, to deny that there is any evil, to hold that it is purely imaginary, an error of the finite mind, or something of that kind,—that is what theosophy does—or, third, to deny the other term of the problem, namely, the goodness of God, and that, of course, means, to deny the existence of God. This is, perhaps, the most frequent source of atheism. But, remark that it is not a purely intellectual source. For feeling is injected into the problem, and heart as well as head is involved in the task. It is often the finest kind of man or woman that is misled by sympathy with all that suffers and the resulting inability to think it all out in terms of God.

What, now, has Catholic philosophy to say about the belief in God? First of all, it tries to argue with the intellectual atheist on purely intellectual grounds. It appeals to the various arguments known as the physical, the teleological and the moral lines of proof. I shall not enter into them here, except to describe them in a general way, because the discussion of any one of them at full length would take more than the entire space available for this paper. What I call the physical argument starts with the recognized validity of the principle "Every effect must have a cause," or "Whatever begins to exist must depend on something else which influenced that beginning." Kantians may quibble and followers of Hume may analyze until there is nothing left to the principle. But science and common sense and our own thoughtful experience show the principle to be valid. If it is valid, then it is applicable in this way: The cause of which you speak is either a dependent cause—itsself an effect—or it is absolutely independent. A series of dependent causes is possible, *m* being an effect of *l*, *l* of *k*, *k* of *j*, *j* of *i*, etc. But such a series cannot be infinite. Somewhere in the line of dependence there must be an *a* before which there is no other

cause, in other words, a first cause, itself uncaused. Not self-caused, for that would be absurd, but self-existent, and uncaused. Such a being is the Infinite God.

The line of reasoning which I call teleological has for its major premise the principle first formulated by Socrates: "Whatever exists for a useful purpose must be the work of an intelligence." The central idea is "design," "adaptation," "purposiveness," and, again avoiding the intricacy of detail, let us appeal to our own experience and our own common sense and we shall realize that the principle is valid. Wherever there is evidence of order, adaptation, the suiting of means to an end, we are convinced that the work in question is the product, not of chance or necessity, but of mind, or intelligence. Under this general principle we now bring the universe as a complex totality manifesting a wonderful interdependence of its parts, a still more wonderful co-operation of these parts and a resulting harmony and beauty which entitle it to be called the *cosmos*, the beautiful, the harmonious. The conclusion drawn from these premises is that the universe as a whole must have had an intelligent Author, or, at least, an intelligent Designer.

The moral arguments for the existence of God are gathered from our innate and ineradicable sense of moral responsibility, the distinction between right and wrong, the existence of conscience, the feeling of obligation or duty. All these are psychological facts which have no adequate explanation except in the existence of a Lawgiver Who lays obligation upon us and to whom we are responsible for our actions. For Kant this was the only absolutely valid argument to prove the existence of God; for Cardinal Newman it was the most persuasive of all the theistic arguments, although there are some even among Catholic philosophers who think it the weakest.

Catholic philosophy appeals to these and other considerations to prove the existence of God. It neglects none, no matter how weak, because experience has absolutely shown that the argument which appeals to one mind may not appeal to another. The mind must, however, be satisfied and reason must be convinced by reasons. And out of all the proofs there will be one at least which will compel intellectual assent and leave no

room for doubt "except such as arises from the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of the human mind." These are Plato's remarkable words in reference to the doctrine of immortality. I repeat them here because I believe that they apply with even greater force to the doctrine of the existence of God. If there were in favor of an abstract or a purely scientific truth as much evidence as there is in the arguments for the existence of God there would be no hesitation in accepting that truth. That the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides is a truth that leaves us perfectly cold so far as feeling is concerned. If it is proved it is proved: if it is not, it is not. But, when our sentiments and our deepest feelings are concerned, as they are in the doctrine that God exists, then, after all the intellectual proof has been brought forward, after our intellect has been convinced, there is still a "hesitation" (*disbelief* is Plato's stronger word) which is emotional rather than mental, and arises from our tremendous interest in the problem. Reason is satisfied; but we are more than reasonable, and our nature calls for other satisfaction besides that of reason.

Catholic philosophy, therefore, first appeals to reason and strives to prove by intellectual evidence the truth that God exists. But it is a fundamental principle of Catholic philosophy that Faith aids Reason. Let us now see what this assistance amounts to, in the question of the existence of God. In the first place, the emotional hesitation to which I have just referred is dissolved in the readiness, the alacrity, even, with which Faith holds to the existence of God as the Author of our destiny, the object of our spiritual longings, the haven in which our soul finds rest. Faith, so to speak, fills in the *schema* of reason. God is the First Cause, says Reason, and we are wholly dependent on Him—the thought is terrifying, or at least disturbing. God is the Father of us all, Faith teaches us, and we are to address Him as Our Father—and there comes a peace in place of disquietude. And if arguments fail to appeal, or, on examination, are found to be faulty, or if the objections of the unbeliever strike us with unanswerable force and threaten

to shake the foundations of conviction, then Faith comes to the aid of reason, and suggests the most human of all protestations, "I believe, Lord: help my unbelief."

Furthermore Faith aids reason in so far as it removes the causes of Atheism. The atheist of perplexed or perverted sentiment is the first type that we mentioned. For his case there is a ready remedy, we think, in the consolations and ministrations of the Great Physician. For it is a sick soul that we have to deal with, a soul overburdened with a sense of the world's injustice, a soul, often a refined and sensitive soul, starved for want of spiritual food, a soul disappointed, disallusioned, wracked with pain of the worst kind, a spiritual *taedium vitae*. Such a soul was that of Augustine in the unhappy days of his spiritual desolation; such a soul was that of Francis of Assisi in the days of his worldliness; and such a soul, we think, is that of many a one for whom the crisis does not end so fortunately. For there are crises in the health of the soul as in that of the body. As in typhoid or some other deadly disease the day, the hour, the moment arrives when the bodily physician stands by and realizes that if the patient survive the ordeal of the present, recovery is a matter of certainty, and if not, then the fatal ending is inevitable. So in the critical moment of the soul's history, it is, often, godlessness or godliness that is the alternative outcome. There, Faith aids reason by the touch of that peace which surpasseth all understanding, and brings order and harmony and contentment out of a chaos of contending feelings and emotions.

With the atheist of conviction, as we decided to call him, the atheist who is actuated not by feeling but by reason, who sees in science an all-sufficient answer to the problems of philosophy, and thinks he can dispense with the "hypothesis," as he calls it, of a God, the aid which Faith furnishes to reason is no less effective, and is even more evident. Faith institutionalized in the Church has stood always for the assertion that science has not eliminated God. I am not willing to enter here into an apology for the Church as a patroness of learning, nor to discuss mooted questions of the treatment of scientists by the Church; I am not going to invoke the wraith of a Galileo or a Bruno

and discuss their cases. What I say is that the Church has distinguished between Science and the individual scientist, and has preserved and proclaimed the weighty utterances of the really great scientists in favor of the existence of a personal God. And this is no insignificant service. In the confusion and turmoil of controversy, when feelings are aroused by conflict of opinions, she has maintained a consistent attitude of confidence in the ultimate findings of natural science. Above all the uproar of assertion and denial, her voice—the voice of the oldest and most authoritative Church—has been heard. She admits that the leaders in physics, in chemistry, in biology and geology have a right to be heard when they speak of the facts which they have discovered and the empirical laws which they are warranted in formulating. But, Atheism, she reminds us, is not a proved fact nor a scientific law, but an inference which belongs to the region neither of chemistry nor of biology nor of physics nor of geology, but to general philosophy or to metaphysics. And the Church has done more. When the statement is made that all the great scientists, by their own example, have discredited belief in God, she calls on us to hesitate ere we accept that dictum as conclusive. Even if it were true that all the great scientists were atheists, it does not follow that they are to be imitated or their example followed. Deference is due to the authority of a scientist only so long as he remains within the confines of his own science: the mathematician may have execrable taste as a poet; the historian may be as unappreciative of music as Macaulay said he himself was. But, have the great scientists been atheists? No need to question the Christian faith of the pioneers of modern science, of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and Leibniz. They are admitted to have been Christians of sincere and public profession. And, when we come to the great names of contemporary science, the case is equally strong. As late as 1891 Tyndal proclaimed that “No greater genius than Robert Mayer has appeared in our century.”¹

¹ Quoted by Kneller, *Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science*, p. 16. To this I am indebted for most of the facts here brought forward in favor of the thesis that the greatest contemporary scientists were earnest believers in God.

And Mayer was not only a theist but a pious Christian. "My early feeling," he writes in 1851, "that scientific truths are to the Christian religion much what brooks and rivers are to the ocean, has become my most vital conviction. Tempted as I was to drift with the tempest of passion, I had made shipwreck of these later years had not in my heaviest hours the mercy of God . . . kept me always in the right path." The Count Von Rumford, Sir Humphrey Davy, James Prescott Joule are names associated with that of Mayer in the most important discoveries of modern physics. These, like Mayer, are to be set among those whose recorded sayings give the lie to the dictum that the great scientists do not believe in God. To these we may add the great name of Lord Kelvin whom, in 1896, the Berlin Academy of Science addressed in these remarkable words: "You have, in a supreme measure, become the teacher of our generation, and among living physicists there are few indeed who have not sat at your feet and who do not gratefully proclaim you as their Master." Now what does Lord Kelvin have to say about science and the existence of God? "It is impossible," he says, "to understand either the beginning or the continuance of life, without an over-ruling creative power," and again, more significantly, "Overpoweringly strong proofs of intelligent and benevolent design lie all around us; and if ever *perplexities, whether metaphysical or scientific*, turn us away from them for a time, they come back upon us with irresistible force, showing us through Nature the influence of a free will, and teaching us that living beings depend on one ever-acting Creator and Ruler." In an address made less than ten years ago he met the issue squarely. He would not agree with a previous speaker who held that science neither affirmed nor denied creative power; he believed that "*Science positively affirmed* creative power." From among the mathematicians, the astronomers, the zoölogists, the biologists, names as great as that of Lord Kelvin in physics could be cited, all believers in God, all men whose studies in science strengthened their faith in the existence of God. The chemists Lavoissier, Dumas, von Liebig, Friedel, names the greatest perhaps in the history of their science, the geologists

Cuvier, Lyell, Dana; the physiologists Müller, Schwann, Claude Bernard, Sir Charles Bell, Louis Pasteur, Laennec, who made modern physiology, were either professed Christians or at least maintained that there is no reason why a scientist should not believe in God. Some of these, as you know, were, like Louis Pasteur, conspicuously faithful to the convictions of their early training; all of them are authority sufficient to offset the assertion that science has dispensed with belief in God.

I have cited the names of these men and quoted the sayings of some of them not for the purpose of building up an argument to refute atheism, but rather to show that the assertion, "Science has discarded belief in God," to be false both as to *Science* which has nothing to say about it, and as to the *scientists*, who on the contrary, if we take the greatest among them, have been on the side of theism. There is no more powerful argument, when dealing with immature minds than the argument from authority. "Who are you," cries the advocate of unbelief, "to set up your verdict against that of the great scientists?" And no other argument, I think, has made so many converts to atheism. The young mind is capable of reasoning about facts, but "wisdom lingers" and the ability to reason about principles is slow to be developed. Is it not a tremendously important thing that Faith, institutionalized in the Churches, comes at this critical moment to the aid of immature reason, shows the fallacy of confounding science with the scientists, preserves the verdict of the really great scientists and, despite the clamor and contention of controversy, preserves the attitude of the psalmist of old: "The heavens proclaim the glory of God, and the firmament shows forth the works of His Hands."

This was one prolific source of atheism, we said, the alleged verdict of science. The other was the problem of evil. And here we have another example of the assistance which, according to Catholic philosophy, Faith furnishes to reason. Reason has not declined the task of solving the mystery of evil. Accepting the terms of the problem, namely, the goodness and omnipotence of God on the one hand and the reality of evil, on the other, it offers various considerations that tend towards a solution of

the question. Reason counsels us to be philosophers for the time being and not let our sympathy with suffering get the better of our calmer judgment. Reason reminds us that much of human suffering is due to human folly and ignorance and sin. It reminds us also that a great deal of suffering of animals is more apparent than real, that the animal body is less highly organized than ours and therefore less capable of pain, that many times an expression of supposed pain is merely an automatic reflex, and that there is just a grain of truth in the contention of the Cartesians that animals are merely machines and have no consciousness at all. Reason further maintains that pain is primarily prophylactic, meaning that it warns us of the approach of danger, that it is the sentinel set to guard the health and life of the body, that the toothache is given us to tell us it is time to consult a dentist, and that an indiscretion of diet that is followed by pain is less likely to be repeated. Thus pain, says the philosopher, is really beneficent, and its existence is easily reconciled with the wisdom and goodness of God. Finally, reason bids us look to the larger purposes of nature and the universe, tells us to consider that where there is order and harmony there must be variety, where there is variety there must be different degrees of perfection, and where there is imperfection there must needs be pain and suffering. Pain would thus be the price that the universe pays for the beauty and the variety and the harmony which are its characteristics.

But, when Reason has said its last word, somehow the soul is still unsatisfied. Philosophising about pain is cold comfort. It is, indeed, a strong mind—there are such minds, though, I believe, they are few—that can get consolation from the reflection that pain is prophylactic, that suffering is an inevitable condition of cosmic perfection, or from any similar thought on the subject of physical evil. Catholic philosophy admits the two terms of the problem, namely the existence of evil and the goodness of God. It gives due weight to all the considerations of the philosopher; but, when philosophy, having said its last word, fails to satisfy the soul, Catholic philosophy turns the problem over to Faith.

Faith, first of all, teaches us that "we know in part and we see in part." We know intimately and sympathetically only a relatively small region of reality. Science, indeed, is constantly widening our horizon. The telescope and the microscope are revealing to us the impressively great and the no less impressively small in the world around us. But it will always, perhaps, be true that beyond the farthest reach of human experience there are cycles of real forces and possibly systems of material substances about which we shall know nothing. Human knowledge will be bounded on all sides, if not by a night of absolute ignorance, at least, by a twilight of uncertainty in which we can see but the dim outlines of hypotheses and theories. What we do see is, then, admittedly, but a fragment of God's real world, and, moreover, the fragment which we do see, being nearest to ourselves, is that which makes the greatest demands on our sympathies. You know what a difference that makes. You might look through a telescope and view with comparative calm the crash of two vast heavenly bodies millions of miles away. But, who could look calmly at the collision of two conveyances in which he knew that human beings were travelling? One may read with feelings of pity and compassion the story of an unknown sufferer, but how those feelings become intensified when one knows the sufferer personally. A sensitive child or a tenderhearted poet may weep at the sight of a flower that withers and dies; any man who loves his horse or his dog may be deeply moved at the news of the death of his favorite, but he is almost inhuman on whom the death of a fellow man known and loved produces no impression of sorrow. The nearer anything is to us the more it draws on our sympathies. We see and we know the portion of reality that is nearest to ourselves, and our capacity for profound feeling renders us less capable of judging its relations to the greater world beyond. Here Faith comes to the aid of reason and though it does not answer every *why* and every *wherefore*, steadfastly teaches us that "somehow good will be the final goal of ill." Faith teaches that God is in His heaven and though our own reason may see many things that appear to be ill, Faith authoritatively asserts that all is well

with the world. If our knowledge were infinite, or even if it were coextensive with reality, we might demand an explanation of every apparent conflict between the existence of evil and the goodness of God. Faith does not do that. It asks us to believe that somehow, in ways incomprehensible to us, evil is, so to speak, subsumed in good and the wisdom and goodness of the Creator are justified. It is our duty to push our knowledge beyond its present boundaries, if we may. It is our privilege to use our powers of observation and our faculty of reasoning to the limit of their capacities. But always with reverence for the hitherto unexplored, and with respect for the truth which lies beyond our reach.

Some one has compared the human race to tiny animals that build on the sands of the sea-shore, short-lived creatures for whom an hour is, perhaps, what a year is to us. These creatures are endowed with an instinct which enables them to reckon with the daily ebb and flow of the sea, so that they build their diminutive villages and cities above the level of high water, with what for them is extraordinary foresight. At the same time, their instinct has not taught them to take into account the longer cycle of changes which every four weeks or so brings the spring tide that destroys whole settlements. Here, says the philosopher, is an image of our own short-sightedness. In the plans of an all-wise and infinite Creator our longest computation of time is but a brief episode. "A thousand years is as one day," and the millions of years of which the geologist speaks are but a small fraction of eternity. All the combined experience of the race as recorded in history is a story begun but not yet finished, a tale as yet but partly told, and as little children are warned to do, we should wait till the story is concluded.

All this should have the effect, not of discouraging the use of reason. For we believe it our duty to know as much as we can about the world in which God has placed us. But when we have learned all that we can, and reason and sentiment are still baffled by the terrible problem of evil, we turn to Faith for assistance and then we begin to understand things which reason never can make plain.

In talking of Catholic philosophy I have made no mention of Pope or Council, or dogmatic definition or inquisitorial decree, because I have had no occasion to do so. The belief in God is common to all the Christian churches, nay, even to Church and Synagogue and Mosque. If the Catholic philosopher turns for aid to the Catholic faith in God, there is no reason why Protestant or Jew or Saracen may not seek similar aid in his own religious institutions. He does not, however, because he separates his theology from his philosophy, his faith from his reason. We think that this is unfortunate. We think it is wrong psychology; for, after all, he is not two persons, the philosopher and the believer, but one, the philosopher who believes. We think it is wrong pedagogically; for all knowledge, to be assimilated, must be unified, and mind abhors unreconciled or unrelated truth as Nature was said to abhor a vacuum. We think it is wrong methodologically; for truth is truth whether it comes through revelation or through reason, and all truth is capable of harmonious adjustment. We think, on the contrary that our method is reasonable, to bring Faith to the aid of reason, and we think further that that method is justified in its results. If Faith has virtue to cure that perplexity of sentiment which often ends in atheism; if it has power to meet the challenge of the atheistic scientist and show that science has not discredited belief in God; if it is able, not indeed, to answer all the questions that arise in regard to evil, but, at least, to put that problem in such terms that it is less bewildering, then we believe that this is a most signal service, which philosophy should be wise enough to welcome.

WILLIAM TURNER.

WAS ST. CYPRIAN AN EPISCOPALIAN?

In a former article contributed to the *Catholic University Bulletin*¹ we dealt with the question of the Ecclesiology of St. Cyprian. Therein we described at length the idea of the Church entertained by the venerable Bishop of Carthage—what to his mind were the elements that entered into the constitution of the religious society established by Christ, and in particular what place in that society he was prepared to allow the Bishop of Rome. We saw that the fundamental principle of the Church's constitution was its unity—its Catholic Unity—one as the seamless robe of Christ, as the sun and its rays, as the tree and its branches, as the fountain and its diffused waters, one to the absolute exclusion of all heresy and schism; that this perfect unity which should characterise the Church despite her widespread development was secured to each local church by the undisputed sway of one bishop, while the unity of the whole Church was maintained by the harmonious concord of all the bishops who participated in one common undivided and indivisible episcopate; that the individual participators in this Catholic episcopate were subject to some higher authority in the Church, vested either in provincial councils, or in the whole episcopal body, to whose canons and decrees they must submit under the penalty of forfeiting their right to rule the faithful; that, in fine, the Bishop of Rome was recognized to possess a very important, though not well defined, part in the exercise of this super-episcopal authority; that, without any overstraining of the evidence, Rome was recognized as the centre of the Catholic Church, and that the source and safeguard of Catholic unity was the chair of Peter, the successor to the See of Peter, the primacy of the Bishop of Rome.

¹ Cf. October and December, 1910.

I. PROFESSOR KOCH'S VIEW.

Since the publication of that article a German work² from the pen of a Catholic professor and edited under the auspices of the eminent scholar, Professor Harnack, of Berlin, has appeared, which deals with the same question—the idea of the Church possessed by St. Cyprian. The author of this work, on the strength of the same materials, and reviewing the same evidence as we did, arrives at a wholly different conclusion. He would make Cyprian a thoroughgoing Episcopalian in matters of Church government, and contends that the preëminence or primacy of the Bishop of Rome was a concept wholly foreign to the mind of the Carthaginian Bishop. He asserts that, when we claim that great Father of the Church in support of the Supremacy of the Pope, we simply distort and misinterpret him, and read into his attitude and writings our own modern beliefs. Our author will admit that in Cyprian's view the basic principle of the Church was its unity, but this unity must be preserved, not by submission to one central supreme authority such as we claim for the Pope, but by submission to the universal episcopate which was held in common by all the bishops, and inviolable by the concord of these bishops. Each bishop was independent of his fellows, and owed his allegiance to no one inferior to God. Once legitimately appointed by the voice of the people and the ordination of his fellow bishops, he ruled his flock by participation in the common episcopal authority, and this office he lost only by violating the Catholic unity, whereby he broke with the episcopal body of the one Catholic Church. But that there was one supreme bishop, one bishop of bishops, to whom all others were subject, who could admit to or exclude from Catholic unity, never occurred to Cyprian; nay, rather, he stoutly repudiated such a claim when put forward by St. Stephen. Hence to the mind of Cyprian, as inter-

² *Cyprian und der römische Primat, eine kirchen- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie*, von Hugo Koch. Leipzig, 1910. (In *Texte und Untersuchungen*.)

preted for us by Professor Koch, the Bishop of Rome, though possessing a certain amount of moral influence and weight because of the political and social preëminence of his See, as regards ecclesiastical authority excelled in nothing his fellow bishops. He, as they, possessed jurisdiction only over his own particular church; he, as they, continued in Catholic unity only as long as he observed the conditions of faith and discipline necessary thereto; he, as they, might fall away from that unity, while communion with him meant communion with the Catholic Church only in the sense in which communion with any member in the episcopate in good standing meant communion with the Catholic Church, which was governed by all the bishops *in solidum* and on an equal footing. Accordingly the Bishop of Rome is regarded by Cyprian, perhaps as *primus inter pares*, but by no means, as *primus inter omnes*. It was pure arrogance then on the part of Pope Stephen to claim authority over the other bishops, and to threaten to cut off from communion those bishops of Africa and Asia, who dared to differ with him on the question of heretical baptism, and the Bishop of Carthage was not slow to tell him as much.

But our author is not satisfied with proving (to his own satisfaction at least) that Cyprian relegated the Pope to the place where he belonged, as one among many, but contends that he did this on grounds of divine authority. For Peter was no more among the Apostles than was the Bishop of Rome among the bishops of the whole Church—just their equal. The much vaunted, and in Professor Koch's opinion, much abused Petrine text amounts simply to this: Peter was appointed by Christ first of the Apostles—first, however, not by a priority of jurisdiction, but by a priority of time, and this latter for a symbolical purpose. The authority which Christ first conferred on Peter alone, He subsequently transferred to the whole College of Apostles, each one of whom possessed the same jurisdiction as Peter,³ or rather were equal sharers with Peter in the common collegiate jurisdiction. Peter's prior reception of power in the order of time had merely a symbolical meaning—

³ Cf. III., 11 sq.

to typify the unity of the Church which had its origin in or began with *one* man. This temporary numerical unity signified the moral unity that should adorn the Church for all ages. And just as Peter was the symbol of unity for the Apostolic Church, so was Rome, the See of St. Peter, the "ideal" or type of unity for the Catholic Church though neither Peter nor Rome surpassed James or Jerusalem in extent of jurisdiction. Hence neither could be called the *causal* principle of Catholic unity, as is the Pope in modern times, but the type or ideal, or at best, the rallying centre of Church unity: but as far as this last point is concerned, the bishops of the Church may rally round any other Catholic bishop, while maintaining in obedience to the divine mandate the Catholic unity essential to the Church of Christ. In a word the constitution and government of the Church consists in a federation of bishops who maintain the Catholic unity and are cemented together in one common episcopate—where the relation of superior to inferior is as absent as in the Apostolic College ⁴—by the concord of peace and goodwill and true Christian charity.

This Cyprianic theory of the Church is not original. Prior to Professor Koch many learned critics chiefly of the Protestant persuasion, such as Lightfoot and Harnack, have championed the same view. Mgr. Batiffol in his learned work, *Primitive Catholicism*,⁵ briefly summarizes the view in this pointed paragraph: "If all the Apostles received the same powers as Peter, if all the Apostles are equal, and Peter is without privilege, all the bishops are equal, and the see of Peter is without privilege. Has not the Bishop of Rome the right to preside in a more effective manner over the Catholic unity of which Peter was the starting-point, to maintain it and secure it by means of a sovereign intervention in the questions of faith and discipline that may arise? No, no more than any other bishop, at least if we keep to the absolute and theoretical point of view taken by Cyprian. . . . There is a universal episcopate which comprises all the bishops; there is no universal bishop. Each bishop is

⁴ v. 37.

⁵ viii, 363.

really a centre of the Church, and the intercommunion of all the bishops makes the unity of the whole. . . . Of the bishops the Bishop of Rome is the one who holds in his hands, so to speak, the threads of the universal communion; but he has nothing to do save to hold them; it is beyond his province to determine by himself the conditions of a communion of which he is not the head but the official representative. Christian unity has for its intimate cause the Holy Ghost, and for its external guarantee the obligation, binding upon all, not to abandon, not to divide, not to trouble the Church of Christ." The theory of Church-government here expounded is a beautiful, vague, and fragile ideal which could ill sustain the strain and test to which Catholic unity would be put in the course of the Church's history. But was this Cyprian's idea of the Church of Christ?

II. PROFESSOR KOCH ON *U. E.* IV.⁶

It cannot be without interest to the readers of the *Bulletin* if we dwell for a short time on the arguments by which Professor Koch sustains his theory as to the ecclesiology of St. Cyprian. Our arguments for a different theory we developed at some length in the former article.⁷ Which theory properly interprets the facts in the case? An impartial examination of the theories in the light of the same evidence, and the sources of evidence are undisputed—the many epistles and treatises, and the various activities of this great martyr bishop as recorded and transmitted by history—must decide the issue. Whichever theory is sustained by the whole evidence and best agrees with all the facts of his life furnishes the true key to the situation, and interprets aright the mind of Cyprian in regard to the constitution of the Christian Church. Having already given our reasons for the opinion that Cyprian believed in the preëminence and primacy of the Bishop of Rome, though not, of course in the well-defined and precise manner in which we, aided by the age-long development of Catholic doctrine,

⁶ *U. E.* = *De Unitate Ecclesiae*.

⁷ *Catholic University Bulletin*, December, 1910.

are enabled to perceive this dogma of our faith, we shall content ourselves in the present article with a brief criticism of the chief argument on which our author relies to uphold his viewpoint. The arguments undermined, his theory lapses.

Now the key to the interpretation of the mind of Cyprian, our author professes to discover in the famous Chapter IV of the *U. E.* Here, he says, we have a formal treatise on ecclesiastical unity—here, if anywhere, we shall discover the true inner mind of Cyprian on the nature and constitution of the Church, and by what means that constitution was to be maintained. In the light of this theological tract we must judge the conduct of Cyprian in his practical government of the Church, and his views, occasionally indefinite and capable of diverse senses, aired from time to time and as emergencies demanded in his epistolary correspondence. An author's exact views on any question we are more likely to discover in a formal treatise than in letters of more directly practical import. What then, in the opinion of Professor Koch, does the tract *U. E.* teach us about the constitution of the Church, and particularly in regard to the office of St. Peter, and of his successor, the Bishop of Rome?

Well, Christ founds the Church on Peter. He entrusts Peter with the care of the sheep, and the primacy is given to Peter, yet all these Petrine titles strongly indicative of supreme authority are, he holds, offset and nullified by the associated statements that the other Apostles after the Resurrection received an equal fellowship both of honor and power, and that "all were shepherds" and that the flock should be "fed by all with unanimous consent."⁸ What mean then those special titles of Peter—that he was to be the rock foundation of the Church, that he personally was to be the shepherd of the sheep, that to him alone in fact was given a primacy of some sort? They had simply a symbolical meaning and purpose. The Church must be one, and this was best signified by Christ when in the beginning He established it on *one*. Peter possessed sole authority for a short space of time and thus typified the unity

⁸ *U. E.*, IV.

to adorn the Church. But Christ never intended that Peter (or his successors), should ever remain the sole strength and foundation of the Church, for soon afterwards He confers on the other Apostles the same powers, so that all the Apostles, as well as all the bishops—the successors of the Apostles become equal sharers in the authority communicated by Christ for the government of the Church—for “the Church is fed by all the Apostles with unanimous consent,” while, “the episcopate is one; each part of which is held by each one for the whole.” Here then is the key to Cyprian’s mind—every other fact and statement no matter how awkward or antagonistic must fall into line with this theory of the Church’s constitution, for has not Cyprian outlined it in a formal treatise of Church unity and government? Is the key itself, we might ask, the right one? For, if we proceed with a false key to unlock the sense of the various items of evidence contained in the life and writings of Cyprian, we may succeed, but to the distortion and perversion of the true meaning of the passages examined, and of the facts reviewed. Has Professor Koch then rightly interpreted the *U. E.* iv? We do not think so. On the contrary we believe that he has misinterpreted both the purpose of the whole treatise, and the sense of this important chapter.

III. PROFESSOR KOCH’S INTERPRETATION OF *U. E.* IV INADMISSIBLE.

The treatise *U. E.* was never intended by its author to be a theocritical disquisition on Catholic unity, and on what means were divinely appointed to maintain that unity in the whole Church. The Church tract had not yet reached that stage of formal development. In the *U. E.* as in so many of his epistles Cyprian addresses himself to the more immediately practical question how that unity, which, by divine institution, belonged to the Church of Christ, should be maintained, *where then and there imperilled*, in the local church. This local unity is secured and heresies and schisms are precluded, by the submission of all to the one bishop who rules each diocese. This

object attained, he more or less assumes that Catholic unity is safeguarded. How inadequate to the maintenance of universal unity was the local unity did not present itself to Cyprian under any practical aspect at this period; hence he does not formally discuss the question—despite the assumption of Professor Koch to the contrary—of the principle or safeguard of Catholic unity or the unity of the universal Church. We say formally for as we shall afterwards see, he implies that principle in the scriptural argument by which he establishes the thesis that the Church *must be one*.

The occasion which called forth this tract *U. E.* determines for us its limited purpose. It was composed and directed against the schismatical parties both at Carthage and Rome,⁹ where the followers of Felicissimus and Novatian were in open revolt against the lawful bishops—Cyprian and Cornelius—and sought to establish in their respective churches rival bishops in the persons of Fortunatus and Novatian. There was no question then of the unity of the whole Church being imperilled by the antagonism of one particular church to another—which condition of affairs would have evoked such a treatment of the question as Professor Koch contemplates—but of the unity of a local church where the one legitimate bishop was opposed by an anti-bishop. Cyprian as a practical churchman composed his work to meet the need of the times, and hence we have in *U. E.* a most perfect treatise on the essential need of Catholic unity, which must be secured in each diocese by the monarchical sway of one bishop. In this connexion a short quotation from Mgr. Batiffol is most appropriate.¹⁰ “It may be said with more fairness that the treatise ‘*De Unitate Ecclesiae*’—a controversial work written for a special occasion—does not set forth a system of the universal church, in other words, of Catholicism: it is concerned exclusively with *this thesis that in every church there is room but for one bishop*. The title of the treatise by

⁹ For discussion on two forms of *U. E.*, iv, for Rome and Carthage, and which was original, cf. Batiffol's *Primitive Catholicism*, p. 366 sq.; and Dom Chapman in *Revue Benedictine*, Oct., 1910.

¹⁰ *Primitive Catholicism*, p. 364.

no means comprises all that the identical title of Bossuet's sermon comprises. If it is true, as St. Fulgentius testifies, that Cyprian's treatise was sometimes entitled "*De Simplicitate praelatorum*," his last title, which is less authentic and less extensive, expressed much better the special point of view to which Cyprian confined himself."

Having shown the general object of the treatise *U. E.* we may now address ourselves to Chapter iv and the construction put upon it by Professor Koch. While admitting that Cyprian does not always give the Petrine text its full historic significance, because he accommodates its sense to his purpose of proving the divine institution of the monarchical episcopate, yet we hold that our author's interpretation is inadmissible. He contends that all the text means to Cyprian is that Peter was made foundation of the Church in the sense that he *first in the order of time* received that power to rule the church which later on he held in no superior manner but in common with the rest of the Apostles. This temporary priority of *one* was intended to symbolize the unity of the Church. "First he gave authority," says Professor Koch, "to one plenipotentiary Apostle: with him began the Church—Peter was the first and deepest stone upon which it was afterwards to be built. The numerical unity at that moment when the Lord spoke the memorable words to Peter is a picture, a symbol, a type of the moral unity which with the multiplication of the Petrine power (in the other Apostles) was to stand in the place of this numerical unity. . . . Peter was *for a while* the one representative of the Apostolic power" which after the post-Resurrection commission of Christ was transferred to and resided in the whole college of Apostles.¹¹

Now this sense of "foundation" as a mere transient and typical priority of power is admissible, and for many reasons. That the office or title of Peter as the foundation on which Christ was to build His church meant simply that Peter alone received for a short space of time that power which was later to be distributed equally among all the Apostles, *to signify* that

¹¹ III, 11, also cf. Chs. IV-VI.

because the first recipient of that power was one, the Church itself must be one, and did not mean that Peter as the one foundation should be the active guarantee and permanent safeguard of ecclesiastical unity—this construction we hold excluded by other evidence from the records of Cyprian as well as by his intimate knowledge of the Gospel history. An epithet almost inseparable from the name of Peter, in the pages of Cyprian, is the title of Church-foundation: “*Petrus super quem aedificavit ecclesiam*” is the ever-recurring phrase, no matter what the circumstances. The notion of mere temporary priority is excluded from its general use on diverse occasions. Take for example epistle 26¹² where the Petrine text in Matt. xvi-18 is made the charter for non-episcopacy (an application, or may we say accommodation? to which Cyprian was much addicted). There he affirms on the support of that text that “the Church is *founded* upon the bishops, and every act of the Church is controlled by these same rulers.” We are not here concerned with the question whether Cyprian rightly bases on those words of Christ to Peter the monarchical episcopate—for his view was that as the episcopate succeeds the Apostolate, so each bishop in his diocese succeeds to the unique position of Peter, that is, as Peter was made by Christ the foundation of His Church, so each bishop is the foundation of each local church, as though the Church built on Peter were the model and parent of each local church—we simply call attention to the fact that the bishops who govern the church by a permanent power, which was to continue unchanged and undivided, are spoken of as the foundation of the Church. By *foundation* then Cyprian does not mean, as Professor Koch would have him mean, mere prior possession, to the exclusion of the idea of superior permanent authority. If the bishops are the foundation of the church then, and its permanent foundation, on the strength of the Petrine text, in the sense that they govern the whole church in common, and each diocese individually, why, we might ask, put a different construction on “foundation” when spoken of Peter as indi-

¹² Numbered according to “Ante Nicene Ff” as transl. by Roberts and Donaldson; Am. Ed., 1886.

cative of his office? We answer there is no reason and the sense of temporary priority of power is a pure fiction invented by Professor Koch to support his theory, but a thought which never occurred to Cyprian. Peter being made the foundation of the Church received a permanent and abiding office designated by that plain figure of speech—the source even of all episcopal authority—for in the above passage the power of the bishops is referred back directly to the Petrine power and not to any redistribution of the same after the Resurrection.

We have already noted the constant association of the note of Church-foundation with the name of Peter. This fact becomes the more curious and suggestive when, as in many instances, there is no reference to the constitution of the Church. In the treatise *De Habitu Virginum*¹³ we find introduced as an incentive of virgins, to despise the vanity of dress and riches, the example of the great Apostle. "Peter also, says Cyprian, to whom the Lord commends His sheep to be fed and guarded, on whom He *placed and founded the Church*, says indeed that he has no silver or gold, but says he is rich in the grace of Christ, etc.": The fact that Peter was the foundation of the Church is here incidentally mentioned as though his unique and inseparable prerogative: while there is no intimation here, nor in so many other places, that after a very brief period Peter ceased to hold that basic position in the Church's life. Furthermore, in this instance as in so many others, we find coupled with this title the other commission of Christ narrated in Jn. xxi. 17, as though that were a privilege equally peculiar to Peter, and the fact that he was made the chief pastor of the flock stands on a level with the fact that he was made the foundation of his Church. The mention of Jn. xxi. 17, reminds us of another consideration of no less importance. Professor Koch contends that Cyprian believed that the power granted Peter in Matt. xvi. 18, remained in Peter's sole possession only until such time as we have described in Jn. xx. 23, when it was parcelled out among or rather transferred to all the Apostles. Now such a belief is incompatible with Cyprian's intimate knowledge of New

¹³ *De H. V.*, Ch. x.

Testament history. For he must have known that Matt. xvi. was but a promise and not a bestowal of power; that a similar promise was made to all the Apostles in Matt. xviii. 18; and while all the Apostles were invested with certain powers in Jn. xx., Peter was invested with his unique power at a still later stage as related in Jn. xxi. So Cyprian, unless we accuse him of profound ignorance of Scripture—a charge repudiated by the evidence of his writings—cannot have meant what Professor Koch would have him to mean. On the contrary he knew that Matt. xvi. gave promise of a special permanent power which instead of being disappointed by Jn. xx. was fulfilled by Jn. xxi.

Let us examine one more instance to discover still more clearly the sense which Cyprian attaches to the title of Peter—the foundation of the Church. Take *Ep.* 39⁵ which was written prior to the composition of *U. E.* and which critics generally regard as the basis of that treatise. Writing against the Schismatics, the Bishop of Carthage says: "They are promising to bring back and recall the lapsed into the Church who themselves have departed from the Church. There is one God, and Christ is one, and there is one Church and one chair founded upon the rock by the word of the Lord." Here we have no intimation of a subsequent re-distribution of the Petrine power of rock foundation of the Church, but on the contrary the unity of the whole Church and the unity of episcopal authority in each Church ("one chair") are held to be proven in the same way by the office conferred on Peter. In what way? We shall answer in the words of the scholarly Dom Chapman.¹⁴ "It seems to me clear enough that Cyprian means that there can only be one building upon one rock, and that Peter just as much as the bishop is a permanent not a transient guarantee of the unity of the edifice which rises upon a single rock." If then Peter is the origin and permanent guarantee of the unity of the whole Church, we may go one step farther and inquire in what sense is Peter the foundation of the Church

¹⁴ *Revue Benedictine*, Oct., 1910, p. 451.

and the guarantee of its unity? This question brings us into a closer examination of the *U. E.* iv.—where Professor Koch professes to discover the key to his interpretation. How do we interpret that chapter? Are its statements consonant with belief in the primacy of St. Peter and his successor the Bishop of Rome? Nay more, does it not lend support to such a belief? Our answer is in the affirmative.

IV. TRUE SENSE OF *U. E.* IV.

To understand aright the structure of the treatise, *U. E.*, we must not lose sight of its purpose. It was composed not as a mere speculative work on ecclesiology, but had a direct and practical import. It was written as an aid to heal the schisms in the local churches of Carthage and Rome, and hence its main object was to emphasize local unity. Hence it insists on the divine principle of unity whereby each church must have but one bishop, and to set up a rival in opposition was to violate the divinely established order of Catholic unity. Clearly is this purpose stated in Chapter VIII, where after quoting the text “and there shall be one fold and one shepherd” Cyprian pointedly asks: “And does any one believe that *in one place* there can be either many shepherds or many flocks?” But as the theoretic basis of the practical conclusion he establishes in Chapter iv by Scriptural proof the divine plan of Catholic unity—that the Church by the institution of Christ should be one. Chapter v reminds bishops of their duty as rulers of the Church to insist on this unity and to recommend it by their own unanimity since they are participators in one common episcopate. The unity of the Church being demonstrated and its recognition and observance as a matter of faith being urged, the next thesis in a theological tract would expound the *divinely instituted means* by which the *universal* Church was to be maintained one—how the unity of the whole Church must be secured. But this proposition was not yet, so to speak, a matter of practical politics, and hence does not come in for formal treatment at the hands of Cyprian. He passes over it,

and coming to the matter of actual and immediate concern he propounds the means by which Catholic unity should be preserved in each local church—by submission in all things to the monarchical rule of one legitimately appointed bishop. Here was the scope of the treatise, and in the light of this practical aim must all its parts be understood. Cyprian like the practical churchman that he was, does not go further afield than is necessary. He does battle with the present foe. He finds local not universal unity imperilled and strikes at the root of the real evil when he demonstrates and insists on the monarchical episcopate as the divine safeguard of local unity. Professor Koch's erroneous interpretation springs from an oversight of this fact. He regards *De Unitate Ecclesiae* as a theological treatise on the Church's constitution and government and would have Chapter v furnish the answer to the formal question: what is the Catholic, as distinguished from the local principle of unity? Now Chapter v simply urges the bishops who rule the Church and who form one episcopate (and this much is perfectly true in any view) to insist on the unity expounded in Chapter iv, and to recommend it by their own unanimity. But this surely is no answer to the question: what is the principle of Catholic unity? Or raising it in a still more pointed form: what is the principle of episcopal unity—since the bishops are so many units who preside over the various local churches? This question, we hold, did not so present itself to Cyprian, nor did he give it any formal consideration, either here, or elsewhere.

But while Cyprian does not formally consider the question, still we believe that his main argument for the unity of the Catholic Church furnishes us with the line of thought he would pursue should such an interrogatory have been proposed for his consideration. What the divine principle of Catholic unity should be: what were the means by which the permanent unity of the Catholic Church should be insured *U. E.* iv answers implicitly. The Church must be one. How do we know? "There is easy proof for faith says Cyprian, in a short summary of the truth. The Lord speaks to Peter and says: 'I say unto

thee that thou art Peter, etc.' And again, after His Resurrection: 'Feed my sheep.' *Upon one He builds His church* and to him commends His sheep to be fed. . . . That he might set forth unity He arranged by His authority the origin of that unity as beginning from one. . . . The beginning proceeds from unity. . . . Does he who does not hold the unity of the Church think that he holds the faith?" Here then is the proof and basis of Catholic unity—the rock-foundation, Peter, is manifestly the abiding principle of Church unity. This unity the bishops—the participators in the common episcopate—should assert and maintain. But an objection arises, —and hereon Professor Koch builds his view, on an objection ¹⁵ which he takes for an integral part of the argument, but the very purpose of the argument and the construction of the sentence excludes such an assumption—against the foregoing proof of unity as springing from and upheld by one man, Peter: "Did not Christ after the Resurrection give all the Apostles an equal power?" "For assuredly the rest of the Apostles were also the same as was Peter endowed with a like partnership both of honor and power." How then was unity to be maintained in the face of this division of power? Behold the specious reasoning by which the schismatics would defend themselves against the inexorable principle of unity. Hence the explanation of Cyprian's severe remark in Chapter v: "Let no one deceive the brotherhood by a falsehood: let no one corrupt the truth of the faith by perfidious prevarication. The episcopate is one, each part of which is held by each one for the whole." But to their contentions that the Apostolate was divided, and therefore the episcopate could be divided, Cyprian's all-sufficient answer was to repeat in various forms the fundamental idea that unity was safeguarded by the fact that the Church was built upon one man—Peter: thus did Christ by His authority dispose the origin of that unity; and thus "the primacy was given to Peter that the Church of Christ might be set forth as one, and the chair as one." ¹⁵ Hence while all the Apostles

¹⁵ For the Cyprianic origin of the different readings of *U. E.*, iv, cf. *Revue Benedictine* (1902), xix, p. 246, and (1910) xxvii, p. 453.

hold a coördinate position with Peter as Apostles, yet to him alone belongs the unique position of rock foundation. From this exposition will be seen how vain is the question of the opponents of our view who significantly ask if Cyprian believes in a primacy or supremacy in the Church, why does he not invoke that as his chief argument in favor of Church unity and as the chief means of maintaining that unity? We answer that he most certainly does. Fittingly therefore may we conclude our interpretation of *U. E.* iv with the words of Cyprian: "And they (Apostles) all are shepherds, and the flock is shown to be one, such as to be fed by all the Apostles with unanimous agreement, that the Church of Christ may be manifested as one. . . . He who holds not the unity of the Church, does he think that he holds the faith? He who strives against and resists the Church, who deserts the Chair of Peter upon whom the Church was founded, does he feel confident that he is in the Church?"

We might take up in detail Professor Koch's long disquisition on *U. E.* iv but enough has been said to show how untenable is his interpretation, and to convince ourselves that in this chapter we have a strong, if implicit, argument for the primacy of Peter as the source and principle—not merely transient and typical, but permanent and causal of Catholic unity. Now having dealt with the central position of our author and having proven that the very evidence on which he primarily relies in support of his theory of the ecclesiology of St. Cyprian rather sustains the view we have propounded, we might take up his further treatment of the question piecemeal and show how equally vain are his efforts to sustain by further epistolary evidence the position assumed at the outset, but this would be to traverse the ground covered by the former article. For if Professor Koch fails in his central argument based on the treatise *U. E.*, he would assuredly have more uphill work to establish a case on the evidence furnished by the epistles. From them, if we omit those dealing with the re-Baptism controversy, we might accumulate evidence of an exceedingly strong character in behalf of the primacy of Rome. Professor Koch will

labor in vain to answer consistently with his theory of episcopalianism these questions which find in our view of a Roman primacy an immediate and obvious solution:—why did foreign councils seek approbation of their decrees at Rome? ¹⁶ why did heretics and schismatics strive for recognition at Rome against the lawful bishops, who in turn neglected not to justify before that See their treatment of the former? ¹⁷ why was Rome requested to depose and set up bishops, ¹⁸ and why did deposed bishops seek re-instatement at the hands of Rome? ¹⁹ why was such universal interest displayed in the election of the bishop of Rome, and such universal recognition of that fact? ²⁰ why does the setting up of a rival bishop of Rome in the person of Novatian cause so much commotion throughout Christendom? why is he said to “assume the primacy”? and why does he undertake to create bishops of his own in all the churches? ²¹ why is Rome said to possess more weighty authority than Carthage? why is it said to be “the root and womb of the Catholic Church” and “the See of Peter, the Chief Church (*ecclesia principalis*) whence the priestly (or episcopal) unity takes its source? Lastly, and this is a matter too often overlooked, why was Rome, on this as on so many other occasions right while its African and Asiatic rivals were in error? Whence, in fine, arose that conscious power of Rome whereby she would cut off from the Catholic unity so many great churches in the interests of orthodox tradition and Christian truth? In unwavering allegiance to his pet theory Professor Koch would explain away all these weighty and pertinent facts. But when too many inconvenient facts have to submit to a strained interpretation in order to fall into line with some preconceived theory or principle, which is not already certain on grounds either of reason or revelation, we begin to suspect the validity and correctness of the theory itself. Hence we reject Professor Koch’s

¹⁶ *Epp.*, 28, 53, 71.

¹⁷ *Epp.*

¹⁸ *Epp.*, 67, 66. Euseb. *H. E.*, VI, 43¹⁰.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Epp.*, 51⁹, 40, 41, 44. Euseb., VII, 5.

²¹ *Epp.*, 75⁸, 51³⁰, 22. *Epp.*, 48³, 44³, 54¹⁴.

view and maintain that the only legitimate explanation of the above facts is that Rome was recognized to possess a superior authority in the government of the Church. And in regard to the attitude of Cyprian to Rome on the question of heretical baptism, if we were to take his utterances for their literal worth at that critical situation we should be forced to assume that Cyprian went back on almost every position on Church discipline and government, acted on and taught and strictly maintained by him hitherto. Hence in all fairness to him, his hasty expressions about the absolute autonomy of each bishop must be explained in consonance with his previous administration and teaching—where he recognized the subjection of the bishop to the Catholic episcopate, to the councils, and to the general discipline of the Church. And if we must tone down these sweeping statements of his—made in the heat of controversy and when his episcopal pride smarted under the threat of excommunication—in one respect, why hesitate to bring them into line also with his previously expressed views on the eminent position of the See of Rome?

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A GREAT SOUTH AMERICAN PHILOLOGIST, RUFINO JOSÉ CUERVO

On the seventeenth of June, 1911, a telegram from the French capital announced to all parts of the Spanish speaking world that the eminent Colombian philologist and writer, Rufino José Cuervo, had departed for a better life. The health of the great scholar had been impaired for many years. A few months before his death his condition became suddenly critical, and the progress of the disease rapidly led him to the grave. He left unfinished his greatest work, the famous *Diccionario de construcción y régimen*.

The problem of the origin, nature and destiny of the world in which we live is the great problem which has inspired the philosophers of all ages and countries. With this problem, the science of language does not seem at first sight to have anything to do. Language is nothing after all but a collection of arbitrary signs of thought, each of which is attached, by a mental association, to the idea it represents, but has no necessary connection with this idea and depends, in its form and vitality, upon the will of men. And yet, the science of language has become, not only a valuable help to the study of history, but the principal means of rightful investigation of the deeds and fates of mankind during the ages which precede direct historical records. Philology is the handmaid of ethnology; it is the principle which guides us in the genealogy of nations. It has thrown an unexpected light on the primitive fraternity of peoples, on the origin of our civilization. More perhaps than physical science, it shows us, as in a mirror, the stereotyped past history of the world.

Like other sciences of nature, the science of language groped its way in the dark for many years before finding its natural path. The reason of this lies in the fact that in experimental sciences an immense number of facts have to be accumulated before the formulation of a law becomes possible. Just as

chemistry and astronomy had to pass through the stages of alchemy and astrology, so linguistics had to appear in a more or less naïve garb before its true nature was ascertained. And indeed we do not need to go far back in the history of philology to find hasty generalizations, baseless hypotheses, inconclusive deductions lying at the foundation of the monument of linguistics, which was then tottering as a house built on sand.

We easily realize that this should have been the case when we bear in mind the fact that, not more than one hundred years ago, etymological studies, which may be regarded as the very foundation of linguistics, did not possess as yet so much as a method, and were limited to the most naïve and unfounded assertions. Our ancestors were particularly fond of those etymologies in which one word is supposed to be derived from the first syllable of several other words, which, when taken together explain the meaning of the word now coined. In the preface to his *Apuntaciones sobre el language bogotano*, Cuervo gives us, as an example of such a childish derivation, the Spanish word *alquiler* (house rent), which was explained by Venegas as derived from the Latin words *alius qui illam habet*. And at the dawn of the nineteenth century, Joseph de Maistre, in the work which constitutes his most lasting title to the admiration of posterity, his admirable *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*, wants us to believe that the word *cadaver* was coined from the first syllable of each one of the three words of the Latin phrase *cara data vermibus*.

With the introduction of Sanskrit into the Western World, a special relationship was found to exist between the languages of Europe and those of Southern Asia, and this was the turning point in the history of philology, the true beginning of the linguistic science. Efforts were at once made in all countries to give to philological studies a scientific basis. Burnouf and Renan in France, Rask in Denmark, Whitney in this country, contributed to build into a consistent whole the immense mass of materials which preceding generations had heaped at random. But it is to Germany more than to any other nation that the science of language owes its marvelous development. There

Bopp, Pott, Grimm, the Schlegels, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Max Müller, undertook and carried to an end the systematic and philosophical treatment of the phenomena of universal language. Even nowadays it is towards Germany that we turn our eyes whenever we are in doubt as to the solution of a linguistic question. We all seem to agree with Whitney that Germany is, far more than any other country, the birthplace and home of the study of language.

It is, however, worthy of notice, although generally ignored, than Spain had the first worker in this line of philological research. The *Catálogo de las lenguas* of the Jesuit Hervas y Panduro, published in 1800, may well be put at the head of the learned works which have helped to give linguistics the rank of honor it now holds among experimental sciences. Before anybody else, Hervas foresaw the importance of Sanskrit in the comparative study of the classical languages. Max Müller credits him with one of the most beautiful discoveries in the field of linguistics, the fixation of the group of the Malayo-Polynesian languages.

Unhappily, Hervas had no followers among his own countrymen. His example was so completely forgotten that Mahn did not hesitate to write the following lines in his "Etymological Investigations":

"In the Romance languages, native etymologists have produced nothing worthy of mention; and it was reserved for a German, Professor Diez of Bonn, to give us, in his "Etymological Dictionary of the Romance Languages," more than could be expected from the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese Academies taken together."

This charge was not devoid of foundation in the middle of the nineteenth century; but it could not have been formulated twenty-five years later. In the latter part of the century, there appeared in Bogota a group of eminent philologists, who soon attracted the attention of the whole world; it was as though the latent energies of the Spanish race had been suddenly aroused from a long slumber. Almost at the same time, there appeared Caro and Cuervo's *Gramática latina*, Cuervo and Manrique's

Muestra de un Diccionario, Isaza's *Diccionario de la Conjugación*, Uricoechea's *Alfabeto fonético* and *Gramática chibcha* and a host of other important works which directed the universal attention of scholars towards the Colombian capital. The love of philology was, as it were, in the air. And when, in 1887, Rafael Uribe Uribe published his learned *Diccionario abreviado de galicismos y provincialismos* no one would have believed that the man who thus appeared before the public for the first time would live one of the most agitated lives which history records and become the arm and the soul of two great political revolutions. It was at that time that the celebrated Venezuelan orator Cecilio Acosta compared Bogota to a German university and, full of enthusiasm, added that by the eminence of its professors and scholars, it could favorably compare with any European intellectual center.

The man who ranked foremost in this movement and soon became its acknowledged leader was Rufino José Cuervo. A scholar of European reputation at twenty-five, he soon became the star which guided Spanish philologists and pointed to them the right path. Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, whose untimely death we all so vividly deplore, proclaimed him the greatest philologist that the Spanish race ever produced.

Born in Bogota on the nineteenth of September, 1844, Rufino José, son of the eminent writer and Vice-President of New Granada, Rufino Cuervo, received his early education in the College of San Bartholomé, directed by the Jesuits. The love of literature he constantly displayed during his life was no doubt due to the influence of these eminent teachers of his youth; but in so far as philology is concerned, he was, in the true sense of the word, a self-made man. The names of Bopp, Diez, Dozy, had not yet penetrated within the Andean region. Philology was still in its infancy and the fame of its creators had not yet spread through these distant regions of the world.

South America possessed, however, a work of great merit which was destined to exercise an immense influence upon the linguistic education of the Colombian youth. Bello's *Gramática de la lengua castellana* was read and commented upon

in all centers of learning and formed a part of the regular college curriculum. South American students had thus in their hands, not only a grammar, but a philosophical study of the Spanish tongue, such as perhaps no other language possesses. It is probably in perusing its pages, fraught with deep learning, that our young Colombian discovered his true vocation. A young man still, his plan of life was already made. Riches, honors, pleasures of the world were given up. He would renounce family ties, shun society life, avoid even frequent intercourse with friends. He would be dead to the world. For him only one thing existed, which he would strive to attain during his whole life and to which he would sacrifice everything else: Knowledge.

Cuervo, however, like many other great men, was not well provided with the goods of fortune and found himself face to face with the problem so brutally thrown before most of us by the necessities of life. With a deep sense of the situation, his father endeavored to inspire his children with a love for manual work. We read in the life of the Vice-President of New Granada that one evening he found his two sons, Rufino and Angel, digging in a corner of their property in the belief that a treasure lay concealed there. "Stop searching, my children," he said to them, "the only treasure you must look for is in your own work."

Several years later, we find the two brothers working side by side, introducing a new industry into their native country, for the brewery in which Rufino and Angel Cuervo spent many years of their youth was the first which was established in Colombia. And yet Cuervo was already a distinguished philologist, correcting the manuscript of his famous *Apuntaciones críticas* during the few moments now and then left to him by his arduous task. It is in this brewery that he began his famous *Diccionario de construcción y régimen*, and Carré, the Argentine, who visited him in Bogota, was not little surprised on seeing manuscripts and learned dissertations lying side by side with bottles and barrels.

At last the hour of liberty sounded. After ten years of

arduous work, Cuervo had succeeded in collecting a small fortune which enabled him to devote all his energies to his intellectual pursuits. Taking with him the immense mass of data gathered in Bogota, he set out for Paris, where he lived during the last thirty years of his life. He was then forty years of age.

At this time Cuervo was already a scholar of immense reputation. His first production on leaving the College of San Bartholomé had been a remarkable monograph on the letter Q, which appeared in the review *La Caridad*, of Bogota. There were published, in the following years, the *Gramática latina* (1867), written in collaboration with Miguel Antonio Caro, a work crowned by the Spanish Academy and declared the best of its kind ever written in Spanish; the *Muestra de un Diccionario de la lengua castellana*, written in collaboration with Gonzales Manrique (1871), in which could be already seen sparkles of the genius which was to inspire the *Diccionario*; and finally, the first edition of that monument of erudition and profound thought, the *Apuntaciones críticas sobre el lenguaje bogotano* (1872).

The *Apuntaciones* was inspired by the problem of the unity of language in South America. During the years that followed their independence, the new born republics, instead of imitating our country, strove with all their might to sever every possible connection with their brethren of the Old World. And this hatred of all connected with Spain was not limited to the political world; it involved also literature and language; it extended to the whole field of human activities. The formation of new national languages was advocated. The use of the letter Y in the spelling of Spanish words was considered anti-patriotic and so great a writer as Juan María Gutiérrez solemnly rejected the diploma which the Spanish Academy had conferred upon him.

Cuervo foresaw the danger of such a mental attitude and he did all in his power to open the eyes of his countrymen. Doubtless he believed in the gradual evolution of language. "Language," he said, "must be studied like a living organism."

Like an organism, it must undergo continual changes. But these changes must not be arbitrary. They must be brought about by the natural course of events; and now that our language has acquired a definite form and possesses a rich literature, they may be almost indefinitely retarded.

For the time being, identity of language was, in his opinion, to be considered as the most powerful bond which could possibly unite South American nations with one another. It was the bulwark destined by Providence to make them strong, to enable them to work side by side and resist any possible foreign invasion. And, since Spain is the birthplace and home of the language used in South America, since to Spain belong the masterpieces which render its literature immortal, it is towards Spain that all South American writers must turn their eyes.

Cuervo did not, however, unconditionally approve all forms used in the peninsula and condemn those used in the New World. He showed that, in many cases, a good Spanish expression had been supplanted in Spain by a gallicism and had persisted in America in its original shape. And he imposed upon the Spanish speaking world the conclusion that if America must turn her eyes towards Spain, Spain must not altogether overlook America.

How effective was Cuervo's influence in bringing about a change in public opinion may well be gathered from the fact that there now exist, in all South American republics, academies of the language, modelled after the Spanish Academy and living in intimate brotherhood with the same. Not more than eleven years after the first edition of the *Apuntaciones*, there came out the following verses from the pen of a great Colombian poet:

“ Her blood, and language, laws and creed,
Spain on America bestowed;
And such the tender care she showed,
Her child was soon a man indeed.

Whereon resolving to be free
And brook no other land as lord,

With Bolivar's immortal sword
He hewed his way to victory.

And how could Spain succumb in war
When so for valor she is known?
Because 'twas she had taught her own—
The conquered taught the conqueror.

Because 'twas she who dowered our line
With language, race, and story rare,
Her glory is our glory e'er
And her declining, our decline.”¹

Biographers of Immanuel Kant tell us that his life passed like the most regular of regular verbs. Of Cuervo's life in Paris, the same might be said. The pleasures which so many seek in the modern Babylon did not alter his program of life. After his daily communion in the Spanish chapel of the *Avenue Friedland* he would retire to his apartment and nothing could divert his attention from his philological studies. The turmoil

¹ Ricardo Carrasquilla, Bogota, 1883. For the English translation of these verses, I am indebted to my friend, Dr. Thomas Walsh.

The original Spanish verses are as follows:

“Raza, lengua, leyes, culto
A América con cariño
Dio España; y el mundo niño
En breve fue mundo adulto

Y se quiso emancipar
Y hubo lucha porfiada
Y de Bolívar la espada
Logró rápida triunfar.

Porque España ha sucumbido
A pesar de su valor?
Porque aprendió el vencedor
Las lecciones del vencido.

Porque ella nos dio su lengua
Su sangre, su grande historia;
Y su gloria es nuestra gloria,
Y su mengua es nuestra mengua.”

of the great city was for him as non-existent. The noise of the Boulevards, the serenades, the operas, the gay, enticing music, did not reach his ear. His eye was not attracted by the splendors before which stare noble and plebeian alike. Amid the human swarm, he remained a hermit. His only distractions were occasional visits from South Americans on a journey through the Old World. If his visitors, as was often the case, were young men with a taste for literature, he would invariably encourage their timid productions. A kind of intuition enabled him to discover youthful talents. It was he, who, in 1893, published the first volume of verses of a youth who was destined to become the glory of Colombian literature, Antonio Gómez Restrepo.

In Paris, Cuervo produced new editions of his *Apuntaciones críticas*, and published the first two volumes of his *Diccionario de construcción y régimen de la lengua castellana*.

The nineteenth century has been called with justice the century of the great dictionaries. It is the century of Littré and Murray, of Webster and Mistral. The name of Rufino José Cuervo may well put by the side of these great names, and the monument he has erected to the Spanish language, although never completed, is, in some respects, without a rival.

It was not simply a dictionary of the language which Cuervo intended to write. It was, says Gómez Restrepo, a work destined to solve all the problems of Spanish syntax, and to give in each particular case, as regards construction and agreement, all that can be gleaned from a thorough study of the classics. Many articles of the Dictionary have the character of extensive and finished monographs, for example, the article on the preposition "a," which filled the famous philologist Darmesteter with admiration.

The appearance of the first volume of the Dictionary, in 1886, was an event in the scientific world. *Le Temps*, of Paris, at once described the volume as the most perfect work of lexicography ever written in any language.

The second volume, which extends as far as the letter D, was published in 1893. In the year 1901, the representatives

of the International American Congress, held in Mexico, solemnly agreed to recommend to their respective governments the subscription of a sum of 210,000 francs to cover the expense of the issue of the unpublished volumes of Cuervo's Dictionary.

Unhappily, the work was never completed. There is left a huge mass of materials; but death did not allow the athlete who brought them together to animate them with the inspiration of his genius. Like Pascal's *Pensées*, the unfinished monument remains as a majestic ruin which no sacrilegious hand will ever touch.

Cuervo's long residence in Paris did not in any way diminish his love for his native country; works published in Bogota occupied a favorite shelf in his library. With the greatest interest, he always followed the land of his birth in her political struggles, in her greatness, and in her faults. He shared her glory, he shared her sorrows. And when there came for Colombia the great trial, when his country hardly recovering from a long and bloody war, saw her territory dismembered, he offered his whole fortune to preserve her national integrity. His generous sacrifice was of no avail; a great international crime had been perpetrated.

During the last years of his life, Cuervo received many proofs of the universal esteem in which he was held. He was offered the cross of the Legion of Honor by the French government. The University of Berlin conferred upon him, at the same time as upon the German Emperor, the degree of Doctor of laws. When the fateful news of his death reached his native country, the Colombian Academy, of which he was one of the founders, honored his memory in an extraordinary session.

His whole country mourned his death. Every Colombian, from the great writer who follows his precepts to the schoolboy who learns to utter his name, cherishes his memory and calls himself his disciple.

LOUIS PERRIER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Immigration and Labor: The Economic Aspects of European Immigration to the United States. By Isaac A. Hourwich, Ph. D. 544 pages. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York, 1912.

According to Dr. Hourwich, an injustice is done to immigrants when they "are blamed for unemployment, female and child labor, the introduction of machinery, unsafe coal mines, lack of organization among wage-earners, congestion in great cities, industrial crises, inability to gain a controlling interest in stock corporations, pauperism, crime, insanity, race suicide, gambling, the continental Sunday, parochial schools, atheism, political corruption, municipal misrule" and finally the McNamara conspiracy. Moreover, the distinction between the "desirable" immigration from northern and western Europe and the "undesirable" immigration from southern and eastern Europe, as made by the immigration restrictionists, is not in his opinion valid upon economic grounds. The arguments that are now used against the immigration of the "undesirables" by those who would restrict immigration were formerly used against those who are now classed as "desirables." The Irish and German immigrants of the middle of the last century were objected to by the Know Nothings partly because of their low standard of living which enabled them to replace native American labor. Dr. Hourwich reasons that the standard of living is the result of the wages received rather than vice versa and that the native Americans could not have risen in the economic scale if European laborers had not come in to take the poorer paid positions. Wages in the factory towns of New England were extremely low, hours were extremely long, and the standard of living among the workers was extremely unsatisfactory before the coming of the Irish and the Germans and when the bulk of the labor was native American.

Race suicide among native Americans is not due to the competition of European immigrants with a lower standard of living since the same phenomenon is observable where this cause is not present. "In the Australian Commonwealth, with her vast continent as yet

unsettled, with a purely Anglo-Saxon population and practically no immigration, the decline of the birth-rate has been as rapid as among Americans of native stock . . . the decrease in the proportion of children began in the United States as early as 1810. The native birth-rate has declined with the increase of the urban population and the relative decrease of the number of farmers."

To the contention of the restrictionist that unskilled labor should be excluded and only skilled mechanics admitted it is objected that in the industrial army the commissioned and non-commissioned officers must not outnumber the privates. "If every immigrant were a skilled mechanic, most of them would nevertheless have to accept employment as unskilled laborers. The special skill of the engineer would give him no superiority at loading coal over a common laborer, nor would the ability to read Shakespeare in the vernacular assure higher wages to a mule-driver."

The economic reasoning is generally sound and the book is one well worth reading for those who wish to know the other side of the immigration restriction question. The work is largely in answer to the Reports of the Immigration Commission.

FRANK O'HARA.

L'Egoïsme Humain: Ses Manifestations Individuelles, Familiales Sociales, par A. Lugan, prêtre-missionnaire d'Albi. Pp. ix + 167. A. Tralin, Paris, 1912.

Père Lugan has given in this little book a convincing and a convicting study of human selfishness. Part one and part two devoted respectively to the individual and to the family hold the mirror up to nature in one way or another for all readers. Part three, almost as extensive as the other two together, is concerned with the operation of this predominating vice in the wider social relations.

Selfishness, says the author, is at the bottom of the derangements in the social system. Men flee civic duties because they are burdensome and may entail the lowering of social rank. Lucrative and honorable positions are the goal. The rich recognize no obligations to the less fortunate. The social sense is lacking in organizations for social relief, trades unions and co-operative societies. Trades unions especially are often of proud and intolerant spirit,

looking only to their own interests without regard to the rights of others. Unless a growth of neighborly love modifies such tendencies, the state which should be the moderator of social forces, will find itself powerless. The professional politician is especially blameworthy and the ordinary citizen is not without guilt. If democracy is to succeed there is need of an education which will prepare men to exercise power.

Economic life also owes its present evils not alone to the self-seeking of the capitalist, although that is a very important cause, but as well to the selfishness of the laborer. "When King Augustus has drunk, all Poland is inebriate" in the opinion of the capitalist. The merchant who has come up from the ranks of labor forgets his former estate, adulterates his merchandise and endangers the public health for the sake of gain; and even the laborer himself is convinced to his own satisfaction that in the economic world there is no cause but labor's. Unless the wall of selfishness that hedges the individual and the social group can be broken down, little advancement can be expected in the harmony of human relations. The law of love, Christianity, can do this, and will, Père Lugan hopes, be more and more effective with the progress of time.

FRANK O'HARA.

L'Ouvrière, par Mlle. Jules Simon, préface de M. Etienne Lamy, de l'Académie Française. 1 vol. in-16 de la collection *Science et Religion*. Prix: 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie., Paris, Pp. 64.

This brochure is written by the grand-daughter of Jules Simon, French statesman and author, who a half century ago published under the same title a work which is still widely read. It was not a change in the laws but a change in manners and customs, in the opinion of the grandfather, that was required to heal the deep wounds in the social body. This change was to come about as a result of the general spread of intelligence through the public schools. The grand-daughter, on the other hand, looks to Christianity for the cure. The little book does not pretend to inform the workingwoman as to the most efficient means of increasing her pay or of shortening her hours, but contents itself with the certainly not less important task of encouraging her to do her individual best.

There are short chapters on the workshop, the return home, the spending of Sunday, confession, communion, reading, suffering, charity, friendship, love, and finally there is a list of addresses of societies, restaurants, homes, furnished rooms and sanatoria in the principal cities of France for the use of the women who is working or traveling.

FRANK O'HARA.

Le conflit de la morale et de la Sociologie, par Simon Deploige, President de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Professeur de la Faculté de Droit à l'Université Catholique de Louvain. Bruxelles, A. DeWitt. (Paris, Félix Alcan.)

Is there an irreducible opposition between the science of ethics and that of sociology? Yes, have replied M. Lévy-Brühl of the University of Paris, and his fellow-philosopher of the Sorbonne, M. Durkheim. The theses of these gentlemen, which they embodied, some years ago, in two books from their respective pens, and have continued to disseminate in their academic courses and occasional publications is, briefly, that sociology, being a science of what *is*, while ethics, *la morale*, is a science of the ideal, of what *ought* to be, the two are incompatible, unless the latter reforms itself, by abandoning its *a priorism*, in order to reconstruct itself from the data of facts which sociology will furnish it. The present dissertation strikes the shields of these two writers fairly in the centre! M. Deploige first examines the Durkheim conception of sociology, and of its relation to the science of morals. Then he traces the origin of social realism to its German sources through French developments. He next proceeds to show that *la morale* between which and his sociology, there exists, according to M. Lévy-Brühl, an irreconcilable conflict, is *la morale* which sprang from the philosophy of Rousseau, and was developed by the eclectic and spiritual line of writers, such as Cousin, Jouffroy, Damiron, Jules Simon, Janet and Caro who have attempted from the notion of the individual to deduce by reason alone rules of conduct and principles of social organization that must be valid everywhere and always. Between this ethics and sociology, there is, admits M. Deploige, a conflict. But to take this school as the only representative of moral philosophy is the glaring mistake which M. Lévy-

Brühl has committed. The charge of *a priorism* advanced against this system, Mr. Deploige demonstrates, cannot be made against the system of St. Thomas and the other scholastics, whose method M. Lévy-Brühl himself, unwittingly, imitates.

La Morale d'après Saint Thomas et les Theologiens Scolastiques. Memento theorique et Guide bibliographique. A. De la Barre, Professeur a l'Institut Catholique. Paris, Gabriel Beauchesne. Pp. xxv + 152.

We have awakened to the fact that the student who would obtain a knowledge of moral theology properly adapted to the treatment of numberless grave questions which the present conditions of the social and economic orders have brought to the foreground must master the fundamental principles of ethics as they have been laid down by the great scholastics and their interpreters of later times. But the scholastics did not treat moral philosophy as a separate subject distinct from theology, moral or dogmatic. The student who, like every student worthy of the name, desires to go to the fountain-heads as he follows his text-book of ethics, finds that he cannot turn to this or that work to read St. Thomas or Suarez handling comprehensively this or that ethical subject. For one question he may have to consult, sometimes, half a dozen different places in the *Summa*, now an article, now an *ad secundum*, now an entire *Quaestio*, and he will have a similar task in the case of other authorities. The volume before us is intended to obviate this difficulty. Its scope embraces the main elements of fundamental ethics—the existence and nature of morality; the good, the end; laws, eternal, natural, positive; conscience. Each topic, definition and thesis is briefly exposed, analytically and synthetically. Concurrently copious and accurate references are given to St. Thomas, and the other classic theologians as well as to the more modern writers of acknowledged authority. Besides, a well chosen bibliography is added containing the names of all the works consulted and cited in the course of the study. A timely, useful work.

Socialism from the Christian Standpoint. Ten Conferences by Father Bernard Vaughan, S. J. Pp. 389. New York, The Macmillan Co.

The course of six lectures on Socialism delivered during the Lent of 1912, in St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York, by the eminent Jesuit preacher, Father Bernard Vaughan was highly appreciated, not alone by the audience which listened to them, but also by the secular press. These six lectures, together with four others, are now published in one volume which may be recommended as a very suitable book to place in the hands of any person in need of an antidote to socialism.

The subject is treated in an easy, popular, rather than a scientific, fashion. And it is not the economics of socialism, but the materialistic philosophy and anti-religious principles which the historic party has from its birth consistently advocated, that Father Vaughan denounces as diametrically opposed to the truths and institutions of Christianity. He says: "Again, I must insist that I am speaking of socialism as a living movement, 'as a philosophy of human progress and as a theory of social evolution' and not as an economic proposition only. There is nothing anti-Christian in the idea that all capital may be owned by the community if it can be lawfully acquired from the individuals and managed for the common good. If socialists could show that all private productive property could be made the property of the state without the violation of any individual right, and managed without danger to man's spiritual or temporal welfare, there are many earnest Catholics who might join hands with them on the question of common ownership. But this is not the question I am discussing. It is socialism as a going concern, as a practical movement, as an energetic propaganda, as an actual energizing enterprise, as a new ethical view of life that I am considering. And I say that historically its cause is inextricably bound up with anti-Christian postulates; its ideal is the State and it worships the State as its maker, as its god."

In his preface Father Vaughan deprecatingly requests that as we peruse his pages we would remember that we are listening to the spoken rather than the written word; that he does not want "to talk like a book." This request was unnecessary. The reader will be dull of fancy who will read these pages without feeling that

he is in the presence of a graceful, forcible speaker intent upon persuading and convincing his audience.

Epîtres de Saint Paul: Vol. II, L'Épître aux Romains, by C. Toussaint, Professeur à l'Université Catholique de Lille. Paris, Gabriel Beauchesne, 1913.

Dr. Toussaint does a remarkable thing in these *Leçons d'Exégèse*: he makes the epistle to the Romans clear, almost limpid. And moreover, he is readable—no light praise for a commentator. The method of exegesis he adopted is, we think, the one that best makes for clearness. Deserting the common plan of explaining the text verse by verse, which generally wearies the student and prevents him from seeing the wood for the trees, he takes up the epistle by sections, by its natural divisions of subject, and gives himself room to expose the apostle's ideas and to show their connection and development. He appends as footnotes to his translation of the epistle such elucidations of verbal difficulties and minor matters as would divert the main current of the thought. Very familiar with the chief commentators, particularly the modern Germans, he does not overload his page with their various interpretations; he selects those most illuminating and generally gives good reasons for the interpretation he himself prefers. His chief interest lies not in the *minutiae* of the text, but in its leading ideas. Here, in his firm grasp and clear exposition of doctrine, we recognize the trained scholastic theologian; while in his patient, objective study of St. Paul's thought, which he does not try to pour into scholastic moulds, we see a true exegete, one who does not allow himself to forget that St. Paul lived before Augustine and Aquinas and was contemporary to Rabbinism of the first century and not the Protestant or Catholic and scholasticism of the sixteenth. Dr. Toussaint has evidently made a close study of systematic biblical theology, with the aid of Holtzmann, Beychlag, Reuss and Prat. He learns from all, but thinks out his own view of St. Paul's meaning and occasionally lights upon an original interpretation. The result is a work of ripe scholarship, of penetration and of remarkably well-balanced judgment.

His aim is not apologetic; but the conclusion of his study, which

he hints at in his preface and leaves the reader of the commentary to infer for himself, is that the epistle to the Romans turns out to be after all, a very orthodox, Roman Catholic document. His work confirms us in the view that careful, sound, objective exegesis is more convincing to non-Catholics than controversial or speculative theology. Productions of unbiased and scholarly exegesis, like this, would certainly be, for many minds, our best apologetic. It is being recognized more and more clearly that the theology of the Reformers was based on an exegesis that was hasty, controversial, very lacking in historical insight and averse to the traditions which threw a reflected light upon the ideas of the apostolic age. The conditions of current interpretation were wanting: which does not prevent us from seeing that this exegesis, nevertheless, had insight into some truths that had been somewhat obscured.

We have some reserves to make. The Introduction, as a whole, is rather commonplace, too text-bookish, not personal enough: it does injustice to the commentary that follows, leading us to expect to find a rather humdrum piece of work. He recounts chronologically the opinions of leading exegetes on the occasion and aims of the epistle. This is well enough, but the opinions are given too summarily to be really enlightening; a clear exposition of the view he takes himself, would, we think, have been far more useful to the student and should at least have been added. Again, we judge that the reader would derive the general impression that St. Paul's theology was less extensive and, except on certain points, less developed than the facts warrant one in believing. This flows from exaggerating the importance of Romans. The epistle contains, without doubt, the apostle's deepest, most original, most intimate thought; but controversy gave this doctrine undue prominence. True, Romans is not directly controversial, but it is the fruit of controversy, the ripened reflection which Paul, in the calm succeeding his victory over the Judaizers, gave to the great problems involved, justification, grace and law, the call of the Gentiles and the rejection of the Jews. His teaching on these deep questions was essential to the life of Christianity; but it occupies small space in his epistles, except in Galatians and Romans, and, outside the few years of controversy, we have no reason for believing it was specially prominent in his apostolic preaching.

This is the second volume of Dr. Toussaint's commentary. In

the first, which we regret to have missed, he treats Thessalonians, Galatians, and Corinthians. In a third volume, he proposes to explain the epistle of the captivity, together with the pastorals and Hebrews. Diffuseness is not a fault of his, but we scarcely think he can do justice to these remaining epistles in less than two volumes. If the rest of his commentary equals this volume, then we shall have in it and in Father Prat's *Théologie de St. Paul* the two works which the student needs for an initiation into the teachings of the great Doctor of the Gentiles.

JOHN T. FENLON.

Sociology in its Psychological Aspects. Charles A. Elwood, Ph. D. New York and London. D. Appleton and Co., 1912. Pp. xiv + 417.

This work, as the author maintains in his preface, is an "introduction to the psychological theory of society." "Accordingly, the book does not aim to furnish a comprehensive view of sociological theory, but only of that section of it which rests immediately upon psychology." The task of the Sociologist is at bottom a psychological one. He must explain social processes in terms of stimulus and response. (P. 81.)

The psychology which lies at the basis of sociology is a functional rather than a structural one, *i. e.*, a psychology of mental powers rather than states of consciousness. Consciousness itself from this point of view is a motor phenomenon and intimately connected with the Katabolic processes of the organism—not of all such activities, but only of those that involve new adjustments to the environment. Therefore our natural tendencies and established reflexes must be products of natural selection in the process of evolution. (P. 99.) The mind is thus a selective and evaluating activity.

As life itself evolved by a process of interaction and could not have been the affair of isolated organisms, so also society did not result from the "coming together of individuals developed in isolation." (P. 125.) Control over the process of getting food led to the formation of groups and the elimination by natural selection of isolated individuals. The other element in the forma-

tion of society is the birth and care of the offspring. The further development of society is brought about by instincts—the innate psychophysical dispositions that have to do with nutrition, reproduction, self-defence, imitation, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, self-abasement, etc. Instinct rather than desire is the real force underlying social development. Desires are complexes of certain cognitions, instincts and feelings. Dr. Ellwood thinks that to use the word desire to designate the primary force of social life would lend too much weight to the feeling element—that is pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain (feeling) are indeed factors but only secondary ones in social development. Intellect enters into social development in its later stages. It affords a clear understanding of social problems and thus makes possible their solution and the intelligent striving of society to its highest perfection. Tarde and Baldwin err by excess in making imitation the fundamental force in the development of society. It must, however, be reckoned with. It is the chief means of propagating *acquired* uniformities in human society and makes for social uniformity. (P. 299 ff.) Adam Smith and Professor Giddings have advocated a sympathy theory of social life. But they too have mistaken a mere instrument in the development of social life for its basis.

Viewing Dr. Ellwood's work as a whole we may say that it is impartially written, full of excellent references, and suggestive of what may be done in Social Psychology. It is, however, of a speculative character. It gives us a theory of society that attempts to recognize all the factors in its development, but these factors, however reasonable they may appear, are only conjectures. The empirical evidence that they are realities is lacking.

THOMAS VERNER MOORE, C. S. F

The Apocalypse of St. John, by J. J. L. Ratton: New York, Benziger Bros, 1912.

The author of this commentary, who is a physician, retired as Lieut.-Colonel from the East Indian Medical Service, has devoted many years to the study of the Apocalypse, and now gives us his third published work on that mysterious and fascinating book of

Holy Scripture. Dr. Ratton sees the Apocalypse as a vast prophetic panorama of the Church's struggles from the apostolic age to the last, when

human Time
 Shall fold its eyelids and the human sky
 Be gathered like a scroll.

The seven churches to which the apostle St. John writes, according to our interpreter, are symbols, each in turn, of the Church universal in its seven ages. The church of Ephesus, for example, symbolizes the Church in its first or apostolic age. The Church in the sixth age, which 'is our own, is symbolized by the Church of Philadelphia, that is, of "brotherly love," the characteristic of the present age. He accepts here the interpretation and also the prophecy of the Venerable Holzhauser who, two centuries ago, "seems to have been inspired when he foretold that a saintly pope and a powerful Christian monarch would appear in the beginning of this age and help the revival of the persecuted Church." The saintly pope is Pius IX, the Christian monarch, the Queen-Empress Victoria. "What the Roman Empire did to pave the way for Christianity, this, and much more, has the British Empire done for the Church in the Victorian era. The spirit of civil and religious liberty lives on in the descendants of the great Queen-Empress, who now reign in more than half the kingdoms of the world, *e. g.*, the British Empire, the German Empire, the Russian Empire, Denmark, Greece, Holland, Norway, and Spain." The "open door" which St. John (II, 8) saw before the Church of Philadelphia, is evident in our era. The interpreter instances the growth of the Church in America, which, according to statistics he cites on the authority of the *New York Journal*, increased from three million adherents in 1856 to between thirteen and fifteen millions in 1908.

We have not space to give the main outlines of Dr. Ratton's interpretation, except to say that to him the millenium signifies the middle ages, from the sixth to the sixteenth century, during which the persecution of the Church ceased and Satan was (in a sense) chained, until loosed from prison at the outbreak of the Protestant Reformation. In almost every detail of the Apocalypse Dr. Ratton sees a prophecy; and in the records of history, which he has most diligently searched out, he finds the fulfilment in a corresponding event.

The commentary is very erudite, the leisurely production of the retired British gentleman-scholar pursuing his favorite study rather than the severe work of the professional scholar. As to the correctness of his interpretation, *quisque abundet in sensu suo*; but we fear, though he brings together many remarkable rapprochements of prophecy and event, that not many will have equal confidence with the author that St. John's meaning has been laid bare. We trust that Lieut-Col. Ratton's works on the Apocalypse, besides the good they accomplish themselves, will have the merit of inspiring English and American Catholic scholars, who have shown no eagerness to unravel the difficulties of the Apocalypse, to examine the theories which seek to explain the inspired book by the light of St. John's own times and the nature of apocalyptic literature. This is a work that needs to be done and is the necessary basis for a less subjective interpretation than Dr. Ratton gives us.

JOHN F. FENLON.

Nestorius et La Controverse Nestorienne. Par Martin Jugie des Augustins de l'Assomption. Paris, Gabriel Beauchesne, 1912. Pp. 326.

The long standing controversy regarding the justice of the sentence of excommunication pronounced against Nestorius at the Council of Ephesus and the respective merits of the accused and his principal opponent St. Cyril of Alexandria, received a fresh impulse by the publication of Loofs' *Nestoriana* in 1905. Loofs expressed himself as an ardent champion of the orthodoxy of Nestorius; but his arguments failed to carry conviction to many critics. Loofs, however, succeeded in arousing great curiosity by calling attention to a work of Nestorius, supposed to be lost, which was still in existence in Syriac. After its discovery several copies were made of this work, one of which found its way into the hands of Mr. Bethune-Baker, who, pending the publication of the original text, drew up a defence of Nestorius (*Nestorius and his Teaching*, Cambridge, 1908) in which he not only acquits Nestorius of the charge of Nestorianism but goes so far as to say that the Nestorian church has never maintained the error condemned at Ephesus. "He (Nestorius) did not think," he says,

"of two distinct persons joined together, but of a single Person who combined in Himself the two distinct things (*substances*) Godhead and manhood with their characteristics (*natures*) complete and intact though united in Him." (P. 87.) Baker's work was the basis of much subsequent discussion. The original text of the document, which Baker entitled the "Bazaar of Heraclides," was published by Bedjan as *Le Livre d'Héraclide de Damas*, Paris, 1910. A French translation by Nau appeared the same year. On the basis of this text and translation, Fr. Jugie now undertakes a re-examination of the entire question. The Book of Heraclides purports to be a pseudonymous *Apologia pro Vita Sua* from the pen of Nestorius himself. As it could hardly be looked on as affording sufficient evidence to settle a question of such importance as that affecting the entire Nestorian controversy, Fr. Jugie wisely extends the field of his investigation to all the other works of Nestorius and to the contemporary documents dealing with his condemnation. In a series of ten chapters the Life and Teaching of Nestorius are discussed and analysed with the view not only of showing how he was regarded by his contemporaries, but of making clear what his doctrinal prepossessions were. There were many hostile factors and elements prominent at the Council of Ephesus, and they may have had an influence greater or less on the personal fortunes of Nestorius, but without being neglected, these elements are all shown to have been secondary to the great doctrinal issue at stake. On this, the primary and essential cause of the conflict, the learned Assumptionist makes it clear that Nestorius cannot be adjudged innocent. One philosophical principle, "every complete nature is a person," vitiated his entire theological system. This principle and its application to Catholic theology were not original with Nestorius, but he must take the blame for the error associated with his name, and for having infected others with the same view, which as Fr. Jugie contends, is still maintained in the Nestorian church. The work is a good exemplification of critical analysis applied to history. It is to be hoped that the temperate estimate of the character of Nestorius no less than the elaborate proof of heterodoxy will aid in settling some phases of the Nestorian question.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

L'Idéalisme franciscain spirituel au XIV^e siècle. Etude Sur Ubertin de Casale. Par Frédégand Callaey, O. M. Cap. (Recueil de Travaux publiés par les Members des Conférences d'Histoire et de Philologie, Université de Louvain). Louvain, Bureau du Recueil, 1911. Pp. xxvii + 280.

Two currents of thought disturbed the Church during the thirteenth and fourteenth century. One is traceable to the efforts of reformers, who found in avarice and luxury the source of the prevailing moral and spiritual degeneration and who insistently advocated, as the way to better things, the practice of poverty. Poverty, however, did not always denote the same thing in the mouths of its various champions. St. Francis of Assisi, not only exemplified what true poverty was, but saved it from the discredit into which fanaticism might have brought it. Some of his followers, the spirituals, declaring that property-holding was incompatible with evangelical perfection, disrupted the order which he had founded. In the same period discussions of a political as well as academic character arose regarding the relations of church and state, which received force and vehemence from the transfer of the papacy to Avignon. Ubertino da Casale was a prominent figure in both controversies. The author of this memoir has attempted to settle two questions in regard to his career which have been a subject of much discussion. What was his attitude on the question of poverty? and what part did he play in the struggle between Pope John XXII and Lewis the Bavarian? Notwithstanding the copiousness of Franciscan literature, the subject does not lend itself to a ready and easy solution. Much of the life of Ubertino is still hidden in obscurity, but his own writings, especially the *Arbor Vitae*, have afforded Fr. Callaey sufficient evidence for the conclusion that neither in character nor teaching can Ubertino be regarded as a true disciple of the Poverello. On the other point, he seems inclined, contrary to the generally accepted view, to exonerate Ubertino from responsibility for the diatribes of Lewis against the Pope and from complicity in the composition of the works of Marsiglio of Padua. The study throws much light on an obscure period in the history of the Church, and deserves the highest praise for the painstaking and scientific spirit in which it is conceived and executed.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Etudes de critique et d'histoire religieuse. Troisième Série:

Les Fêtes de Noel et de l'Epiphanie; Les Origines du Culte des Saints (les Saints sont-ils les successeurs des Dieux); Les Origines de la Fête et du Dogma de l'Immaculée Conception; La Question du Meurtre Rituel chez les Juifs. Par L'Abbé E. Vacandard. Librairie Victor Lecoffre. J. Gabalda & Cie. Paris, 1912. 12mo., pp. 377.

These four liturgical studies are more elaborate than the short essays which usually compose a collection of this kind. They are, with the exception of the last, exhaustive studies of interesting topics which are usually dealt with piecemeal. The first contains nothing new in regard to the early celebration of the Christmas festival, and the Feast of the Epiphany. Much that is of interest regarding the solemnities observed on these occasions makes this essay a small treatise on one liturgical cycle. The second and longest essay deals with the theories of Saintyves and Lucius regarding the veneration accorded to saints and martyrs in the early church. These authors, whose views have a counterpart in the opinions of Fraser, represent the saints and martyrs as simply stepping into the shoes of the deposed local and domestic pagan deities, and receiving the honors and attributes of the latter. Vacandard has cleverly demonstrated in this study how little ground there is for such assertions. The third essay is especially meritorious in dealing with the history of the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception in the Middle Ages. The fourth is a protest against the erroneous and hurtful assertion that the Jews are guilty of the crime of "ritual murders."

PATRICK J. HEALY.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Letter of the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Rector of the
Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

THE VATICAN,

December 10, 1912.

Dear Monsignor Shahan:—

I was delighted to learn from your recent letter that the Catholic University of America, so wisely and zealously directed by you, has entered on such a successful year. The increase over the preceding year is truly remarkable and gives bright hopes for the future.

Considering the hold the University has already taken in the Great Republic of the West, and the well merited confidence it is inspiring in the minds of both lay and ecclesiastical aspirants to higher education and culture, I have no doubt that its influence on the spread of the Catholic Faith, of Catholic principles and ideals throughout the country, will be of the utmost moment and of immense benefit.

It is of the greatest importance that the clergy, as far as possible, avail themselves of the opportunities afforded them by the Catholic University of acquiring that higher education that will fit them, in a certain sense, for the arduous labors of their very special Apostolate.

The Holy Father most cordially bestows the Apostolic Benediction on you, Very Rev. Rector, on the Members of the Staff, and on all who attend the University. Wishing all every success,

Yours very sincerely in J. C.,

[Signed] R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL.

VERY REV. MGR. TH. J. SHAHAN, Rector,
Catholic University of America.
Washington, D. C.

Gibbons Memorial Hall.

The Gibbons Memorial Hall, which is now completed, is situated on the grounds of the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. The length of the building runs parallel with the Bunker Hill Road, and is placed midway between the present main entrance to the grounds and Albert Hall.

The building proper consists of a central tower and two wings running from same, in the directions east and west.

The architectural style of the building is a modified form of the Tudor or Early Perpendicular Gothic, which, on account of its practicability, effectiveness, and comparatively low cost, seems particularly well adapted to the requirements of University buildings.

The exterior is built of Port Deposit Granite laid in irregular ashlar with square beds and joints, and the trimmings of Indiana Buff Limestone.

The Central Tower (including the four turrets) is fifty-two feet eight inches square, and seventy-five feet high above grade level. The basement will be fitted up with all accommodations and conveniences for visiting athletic teams. The main hall occupies the height of the first and second stories (about twenty-two feet in the clear) and will be used for receptions, recreation-room for the students, offices, etc. On the side facing the campus is the main entrance, reached by a flight of steps seventeen feet wide. Inside of the main entrance doorway is a vestibule, enclosed by carved oak panelled screen work and leaded glass lights. On either side are alcoves containing seat-benches, etc. On the side of hall opposite the main entrance, is a large fireplace and Caen stone mantel of elaborate gothic design. The mantel is over twenty feet high. In a part of the wall space on either side of same, are two large twelve light mullioned and traceried windows, filled in with specially designed, leaded Cathedral and Venetian glass work. In the centre of each light, and in glass decoration, are twelve shields, each containing an emblem of one of the apostles.

In the center of the other two wall spaces or sides of hall, are double doors leading into the corridors of wings. On either side of these doors are handsomely carved and traceried stalls with open-work canopies, all of selected quartered oak. On the back panel of each stall division (sixteen in number) will be placed flat

bronze tablets in the shape of decorative shields and inscribed with the names of the "Benefactors" of this Memorial building.

The ceiling of hall is richly coffered and moulded and from five of the main panellings will hang, specially designed Gothic electric light fixtures of fire-gilt bronze. That portion of the walls above the top lines of stalls and canopies over other openings will be covered with Spanish leather of a character forming a suitable background for decorative paintings, etc. One magnificent oil painting has already been presented by the Hon. John D. Crimmins of New York. The subject is "The Death of Leo XII." It was painted by Marquise de Wentworth and is of particular interest in that the figures are all portraits. The floor is of Siena marble mosaic with a marble mosaic border of Gothic design. The ground plan of this main hall is octagonal. In the four angle wall-spaces, are doors leading into the turrets; two of these contain stairways and the other two are fitted up for offices.

The three upper stories of tower are arranged for students' rooms (single and en suite) with six of the turret rooms having baths, lavatories, etc. From the central corridor on the top floor, access is obtained to the flat roofs of the two wings.

The basement of wing running east, is fitted up as a chapel, complete in all its appointments and for the special use of students and visitors. It has accommodations for about 450 people. The corresponding basement in the west wing will be used as a gymnasium, recreation room, store-rooms, etc.

The three upper floors of each wing are divided into rooms for students, single and en suite. In the west wing are the administrators' rooms and offices. Each student's room has hot and cold running water, built-in wardrobes, electric light and suitable furnishings.

Each wing is forty feet wide and one hundred and four feet ten inches in length. Ample toilet facilities, store-rooms and other conveniences have been provided for. There are separate entrances to each wing from the campus.

The entire building throughout is of fireproof construction. All floors and the roof are of re-enforced concrete. All partitions are of terra-cotta blocks or mackite. Staircases are of iron with marble treads. Halls and corridors are laid with Welsh quarry tiles. Lavatory partitions, wainscot, etc., are of pink Tennessee marble. All trim, doors and woodwork generally are of selected quartered

oak, finished with a rich gray-green tint or stain. The hardware is of heavy, plain bronze. The windows are glazed with leaded plate glass, quarry pattern. The roofs are surrounded by a crenellated masonry parapet.

The total length of the building is two hundred and sixty-two feet four inches.

Above the main entrance is the inscription, "Gibbons Memorial Hall" and in the oriel windows above is a canopied niche, which will contain an heroic size statue of the Cardinal.

Other carvings about the building yet remain to be done, such as the lower projecting base of the oriel windows.

The bronze outside standard lights at main entrance stoop and the hanging bracket lights over entrances to wings, are specially designed for this building and are the gift of Mr. M. J. Gibbons of Dayton, Ohio.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul. The Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology, was celebrated by a High Mass in the Chapel of Gibbons Hall, on Saturday, January 25. The celebrant of the Mass was Very Reverend Patrick J. Healy, Dean of the Faculty of Theology; the preacher was Reverend Doctor James J. Fox.

Death of Mr. Maurice J. Shahan. On December 14 a solemn Requiem Mass was celebrated in Divinity Chapel for the repose of the soul of the late Maurice J. Shahan, father of the Right Reverend Rector. The funeral was attended by representatives of the faculties of theology, philosophy, letters, law and science, and during the last month appropriate resolutions of condolence were passed by the various academic bodies and by the student societies of the University.

Shahan Debating Society. Preliminary Debates are being held in preparation for the Annual Debating Contest, which will take place this month.

Leo XIII Lyceum. The Leo XIII Lyceum has elected the following officers for the year: President, V. P. Dooley; Vice-President, S. E. Hurley; Secretary, Samuel Shay; Treasurer, J. J. Burke.

Public Lectures. The following are the subjects and dates for the public lectures to be given this winter at McMahon Hall on Thursday afternoons.

January 16.—“The History of Temperance in the United States.” (Father Mathew Lecture). Rev. Dr. Walter J. Shanley.

January 23.—“Mithraism and Christianity.” V. Rev. Dr. Charles F. Aiken.

January 30.—“Catholicism and America.” V. Rev. Walter Elliott, C. S. P.

February 6.—“The Russian Church.” Rev. Sigourney W. Fay, S. T. L.

February 13.—“Catholicism and the Balkans.” Rev. Sigourney W. Fay, S. T. L.

February 20.—“Minor Irish Poets (1800-1850).” Dr. Patrick J. Lennox.

February 27.—“Our African Missions.” Monsignor Freri, D. C. L.

March 7.—“The Scholastics as Educators.” Rev. Dr. Patrick J. McCormick.